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1. Purposes of the Thesis. 
The first purpose of this thesis is to extract from 
James's thinking those various strands pertinent to value and 
personality. By selection it is hoped to systematize those 
strands in harmony with James's philosophic perspective to 
which it belongs rather than with some independent metaphysics 
or psychology. Investigations of James have always been popu-
lar. While his psychology dominates, there are countless pro-
jects of adequacy that treat his pragmatism, epistemology, 
metaphysics, and ethics. Dr. MacLeod endeavored to indicate 
the unity of these subject matters by interrelating James's 
psycholo~ to his wider philosophy.1 
It is hoped that this thesis will further that endeavor 
by evaluating what James {in the tradition of Emerson) consid-
ered as the "whole man". For both of these thinkers, whom 
Royce considered as two of the three greatest philosophers in 
America, the whole man is an object of concrete and experien-
tial study •2 
The area of personality and value has been selected for 
-~~-------------~-~-1. See MacLeod, SIWJ. 
2. As a specific route of inquiry, this view is suggested by 
the present writer. Emerson and James, however, were directly 
concerned with this basic view of the person. For Emerson see 
Works, 45, 64, the whole of "Circles", 131, and 856-857. For 
James see VRE, 321-333, 356-358, 489, 505; PO, 299-300 and SPP, 
92, 97. 
three reasons. It is first of all the most timely subject 
matter in philosophy, psychology, and literature. Secondly, 
these themes are a natural topic of James's thinking. Lastly, 
the area of personality and value qualifies and harmonizes par-
1 ticular doctrines of James. 1 These reasons imply that James's 
thinking on personality is organic with his thinking on value. 
While either alone appears weak and insufficient, together 
they comprise a many-sided treatment of U1e whole man. Indeed, 
one of the major points of this thesis is that for James, value 
and valuing are of the very essence of personality. 
Human conduct and value (or personality in the broad sense 
of the term) are prima facie given in experience. They exist 
and function in a continuous, purposeful, and intelligible 
whole. Personality is analyzed into will, feeling, and reason 
only for the convenience of more specialized interest. These 
entities, unlike the existential functions of personality and 
valuation, are not empirical nor do they refer to the whole 
man. This allusion is made to emphasize that the present in-
vestigation cannot accept these cleava&es as ultimate, but 
must maintain the goal of seeking for the whole man. While an 
inquiry into this empirical whole is the immediate purpose, the 
significance of James's interpretation represents the second 
and completed purpose. 
A word should be said pertinent to the limitations of 
this thesis. It is possible to consider everything James has 
said as illuminating his meanings of personality and value. 
---------------------1. Dewey made this suggestion in PC, 19ff. 
2. 
These broad subject matters might well encompass his metaphy-
sical and psychological doctrines as well. Some principles of 
selection are natural and practical. With deference to per-
spective and brevity this thesis will mention but not evaluate 
those writings of James that do not have a direct bearing upon 
the present purposes. 
2. The Problems of the Thesis. 
i. The Problem of Method. 
It is hoped that this thesis will derive an integrated, 
organized meaning from the strands in James's thinking perti-
nent to personality and value. This is a high level of abstrac-
tion. Every student is aware that James has written no system-
atic doctrine that can be identified as value or personality 
theory, much less a theory of the "whole mann. To be sure, 
James has referred to the moral life, the self, consciousness, 
and motives. But these doctrines are found in his psychology, 
metaphysics, and in various essays. Certainly any attempt to 
synthesize a theory of personality and value from these various 
strands sets a problem of method. 
The student sensitive to critical understanding cannot 
disregard the need for a guide or method in order to under-
stand philosophy. Those who forget guides and methods are 
sometimes those who rely upon secondary reports and "stimulus-
words" for an effective comprehension. This carelessness is 
somewhat evident in the literature about James. A pseudo-
criticism in the early thirties became theatrical when Giovanni 
3. 
Paoini and Mussolini ungraciously acknowledged their "debt" to 
IJames and Dewey. Such reasoning has led several continental 
thinkers to caricature James as the philosopher of laissez-
faire and Dewey as the philosopher of the American business-
man. 
These dangers suggest the need for a critical perspective. 
Some internal method must be established to meet James on his 
own ground, as well as an external method to evaluate James 
in relation to contemporary life. Dr. Brightman points the way 
to such a perspective in his methods of "internal and external 
criticism".1 Dr. Brightman's plea for an empathic appreciation 
corresponds to the present purpose of establishing the intended 
meaning of James's doctrines. The purpose of this method is to 
ascertain what personality and value mean to James, irrespec-
1 
tive of standards external to the thought of James. In other 
words, the present inquiry must first establish the meaning of 
the whole man before any signification or evaluation can be 
made. Dr. Brightman's method of internal criticism corres-
ponds to the present method of implied meaning and criticism 
based upon those meanings. The method of significance includes 
I Dr. Brightman's "external criticism" and will be applied in 
Chapter IV. The method of significance considers three main 
problems; what is James experiential referent for the whole man, 
how important is that idea, and what external criticism should 
be made of it. 
-------------------~ 1. See Brightman, POR. XV and XVI, and especially Brightman in 
Schilpp, PBR. 54lff. 
4. 
ii. The Problem of Meaning. 
The problem of meaning presents a two-fold task. The 
first task is to ascertain James's intended meaning of person-
ality and value. The second responsibility is to evaluate 
these meanings by their implied meanings and then by justifi-
able internal criticisms. 
As an inquiry, this thesis must justify its attempt to 
establish a new interpretation. There appear to be at least 
three advantages favoring such a project. One is that James, 
like Edwards and Emerson, is more concerned with recording 
vast areas of experience than with disciplining abstract ideas 
to rigid lo~ical form. Edwards, it should be added, had the 
greatest interest of the three in abstract ideas. James's 
1 imaginative essays, for example, cannot be treated in the same 
way as can hie skilled and technical frinciples. James may 
have chosen the essay form (not "sermonizing" as Santayana 
would have itl) to communicate ideas best suited to that medi-
um. There is certainly some truth to the saying that James 
wrote psychology like a novelist. Another justification emerge ! 
from the need to evaluate the many-sided criticisms directed 
at James. A final advantage of the method lies in its sensi-
tivity to semantic discipline. No dictionary could help the 
student ascertain what James meant by "pure experience". "feel-
ing". the "moreness" in religious experience, "thisness", and 
the "perchings and fringings" of consciousness. If these are 
empirical ideas, they can only be defined by exploring the 
area of ex erience to which James refers. 
========~~==== 
5. 
This justification is no index to success. Nor does it 
claim autonomy in inquiry. It merely suggests tentative me-
thods and constructs to understand James. Whether it can 
II 
achieve this end is unknown. But it may, however, at least 
compensate for the disappointment felt by Merrington,1 who 
claims that James has not provided for a "centre of experi-
ence", and for the disillusion of Wright, who after three read-
ings of James decided that he must "consult some more thorough 
treatise". 2 
iii. The Problem of Significance. 
The problem of meaning focuses upon the point of view of 
the postulates and principles of the subject matter under in-
vestigation. The problem of significance focuses upon the val-
l ue and validity of those meanings. The hypothesis of signifi-
cance isa the significance of an idea can be gauged proportion-
ately to the validity and value of the designata referred to in 
continuous human experience. That hypothesis, along with re-
lated constructs, will be tested in Chapter IV. The present 
task is to justify the need for this method of criticism. 
Any judgment of value implies significance. To say that 
X prefers 0 not only designates a positive preference, but 
implies that 0 stands in a particular relation to the needs, 
attitudes, and values of X. An element of selection is im-
plied. 0 is preferred rather than the present state, or the 
preference of 0 is made concomitant with the rejection of other 
-------~----~-------1. Merrington, PP~ 21-22. 
2. Wrip:ht, BI4P, 508-509. 
6. 
possible preferences. T.be point is simply that this selective 
I experience can be signified and can be evaluated as to its 
importance. What person bas not inquired into significance in 
his own way? The need is clear for a conceptual tool to as-
certain the relative import of an idea, or a preference. T.be 
student must have some empirical frame of reference to test, 
for example, whether Hegel's PhenomenologY is more or less 
significant than Will Durant's §tory of PhilosopQx. can he by 
some method relate logic to valuational inquiry in order to 
determine whether Hegel is more or less significant than Dur-
ant? 
There are ma~ ways to avoid the problem. An appeal can 
be made to either authority, the crowd, or to pleasure. Some 
might say that since Durant is easier to understand than Hegel, 
then he is more significant. Others might say that since Hegel 
, is more respected, then he is more significant. Another alter-
native to the problem lies in a rigid positivism. One might 
take Ayer seriously and say that •since the expression of a 
value-judgment is not a proposition, the question of truth or 
falsehood does not here arisen.l 
~ 
An alternative to avoiding the problem lies in reflective 
inquiry. If the problem is to ascertain the relative signifi-
cance or importance of James's thinking about personality and 
value, then a suitable test must be devised and applied to 
James. That device involves a two-fold function and character. ! 




========~1=. _ Ayer,~~=~==' -2=2=·==========================================~========= 
past experiences and attempt to determine their contribution 
to life as a whole. With the intended meaning grasped, it will 
be a simpler matter to determine the import these problems and 
emphases have had for writers preceding and following James. 
The hypothesis is prospective as well as retrospective. It 
would also test the ability of these meanings to create new 





The problem of significance thus has a socio-cultural ret-
1 
erence. As Windelband has suggested, the student must evaluate 
!philosophical ideas not only on an individual basis, but also 
I 
I I 
according to the culture within which they function. 1 Commager II 
Jhas recently postulated the "American Mind" as an evolution of I 
! ideas in the United States since 1880.2 An inquiry into signi-
I 
l ficance will want to learn what James has contributed to this 
,general pattern and which of ideas on personality and value 
still prevail. In the preface to Science and the Modern World, 
Whitehead has referred to a "climate of opinion" and the "men-
ltality of an epoch" as determining the dominant perspective of 
1 the times. This inquiry will desire to ascertain James's rela-
tion to this climate with special reference to his theory of 
personality and value. One external test of significance is to 
Jsee if writers on personality and value other than James have 
had similar emphases and are concerned with similar experiences. 
The problems of meaning and significance have been 
-~~-~---------------See Windelband, HP, 8-15. 
See Commager, AM, vii-ix. 
8. 
suggested as a key to an understanding of what James considers 
as the whole man. The methods accompanying these problems are 
intended to complement those of other investigators. After 
other relevant investigations have been acknowledged, this 
thesis will proceed to a detailed analysis of James's intended 
meanings of personal i ty and value. 
3. Relevant Investigations of the Subject Matter. 
Any inquiry into an established field presupposes some 
dissatisfaction with the material that has accumulated within 
that area. Without novelty there would be no motive in dis-
turbing evaluations of the past. This thesis developed out of 
such dissatisfaction with the interpretations of James. While 
some writers have erred by commission in misunderstanding 
James, others have erred by omission in neglecting a total 
evaluation of his writings. 
While the literature is plentiful with reference to James 
on pragmatism in general. there are some who have mistaken his 
specific emphases and intentions.1 upon reading the Pragmatism 
Santayana complains that he "could not stomach that way of 
speaking about truth". 2 Susanne Langer considers the will to 
believe as a "nostalgic plea" and regrets its distortion from 
James's tough~inded philosophy.3 Russell is less patient and 
condemns James's philosophy as "a form of the subjective 
~-------------------1. A later hypothesis of this thesis will be that for James 
pra~matism is only a method derived from his view of the whole 
man. 
2. Santayana. BHO. 14. 






i. George Santayana. 
Santayana's interpretations of James are of merit since he 
was among the first to see the wide meaning and significance of 
James's thinking on personality and value. Someone has said 
that the United States did not appreciate James until he was 
imported from the continent. Whatever the truth of this state-
ment. it is certain that Santayana was among those who made 
this aopreciation felt. 
As a naturalist Santavana felt James's intended meaning, 
but as a classicist he could not aooreciate James's whole mean-
1~ of personality nor see its place in the American scene. He 
has observed that James "bad a prophetic sympathy with the 
~---------~-----~---1. Russell. BWP. 818. 
10. 
· dawning sentiments of the age, with the moods of the dumb ma-
jority. His scattered words caught fire in ma~ parts of the 
world •1 Santayana has shown that the key to James's meaning 
lies in the ever-changing stream of experience.2 He shows 
that James conceived of experience both ideally and behavioral-
! ly. Although he strongly objected to James's transition from 
experience to ~objective fact".3 santayana does agree that 
James's account is psychologically descriptive. To make this 
leap~ santayana himself employs a doctrine of essence. 
Another important insight that Santayana contributes con-
cerned James's philosophical perspective. He says that for 
James, "radical empiricism and pragmatism were in his own mind 
only methods, his doctrine, if he may be said to have one, was 
agnosticiam".4 Though this does not explain why James believed 
in God. it does point to the skepticism, uncertainty, and de-
mand for workable truths that constitute James's perspective. 
A second quality of that perspective is intelligence. Santay-
ana describes it as a Rpractical affair of adjustment".5 He 
sees the individual, according to James, as a skeptical, tough-
minded person who uses intelli~ence in his adjustment to life. 
Faith is neither abstract nor autistic. It is rather a neces-
sary postulate made on the basis of experienced needs. It is 
----~---~----~~-~-~-1. Santayana, won. 204. 
12. This insight has helped the present investigator to see 
that any account of James's theory of personality must begin 
with his psychology of experience. See II, 11. 
3. Santayana, BHO, 15. 
4. Santayana, COOS, 74-75. 
5. santayana, won. 206. 
11. 
the skeptic's attempt to adjust according to a testing of 
future involvements. santayana himself differs from James 
when he says. believe only if you must, but realize that your 
belief is limited and not the truth. 
The difficulty in Santayana's appreciation of James's 
theory is that he cannot accept such a picture ot personality 
seriously. He saw James as a metaphysical romanticist, tainted 
with irrationalism and subjectivism. Geared to his own intel-
lectual ancestry, Santayana could not see the emergence of a 
distinctively American philosop~. He never saw any relation-
ship or continuity among Edwards, Emerson, James, and Dewey. 
Though his insights are valuable, his unique blend of natural-
ism and Roman Catholicism form a perspective that seriously 
limits Santayana's understanding of James•s meaning of person-
ality and value. 
ii. Ralph Barton Perry. 
It is natural that Perry's work would be of the first 
order since the majority of Jamesian interpretations have been 
concerned with his life and philosoohy as a whole. Perry is 
valuable for the problem at hand. He clarifies, for example, 
the so-called •irrationalism in James. He says that James 
ulooked to philosophy to emancipate psychology from philosophy~ 
Here Perry is sensitive to James's intended meaning rather than jj 
to systematic implication. He shows the role of James's atti-
tude toward science, and how that attitude influenced James's 
--------~-----------
12. 
l. Perry, TCWJ, II, 72. 
========~== '========================================~========= 
ethics and psychology. 
Perry also has a keen insight into the significance of 
James's thinking on personality. He observes that HJames is 
the first of the psychological philosophers and the last of the 
philosophical psychologists 11 • 1 He sees James's purpose in 
''germinal ideastt. Accepting a Darwinian notion of mind, James 
I rejected Spencer because Spencer denied the significance of the 
moral struggle. Though James is Darv1inian, Perry accurately 
sees that James does not reduce values to their biolo~ical 
!origins, though he does insist upon their continuity. 
Perry also indicates the significance of James's attempt 
to break away from a contemplative philosophy to a participa-
tive theory of personality. James's stress upon individuality 
l is not based upon metaphysical pluralism, but pluralism is 
based upon the critical function of each personality. Perry 
also suggests the rise of an organic value theory in James, 
and the unity of motivational and cognitive factors. 
iii. Julius Seelye Bixler. 
Just as the purpose of this thesis is to extract from 
James's writi~s a theory of personality and value, Bixler's 
I purpose has been to extract the religious views of James. Such 
a task entails a high level of abstraction, but Bixler has 
done a commendable job. Too often, writers have extracted a 
theory or doctrine from James only to isolate it from its con-
text, and thus rendering it unintelligible.2 This thesis hopes 
--------------------1. Perry, Art.{l943). 
2. See Burtt, TRP, 410-415. After removing religion and value 
13. 
to carry on the critical faithfulness that is evident in Bix-
ler's investigation. 
I Bixler has emphasized the creative faith and emphasis on 
achievement that is present in James's view of personality. He 
I has shown that, for James, humanism is not subordinated to 
theism, but functions in cooperation with it. James's indivi-
dual, according to Bixler, is not a romantic mystic, but a 
II responsible person trying to find the meaning of his value ex-
periences. 
Like Dr. Brightman, Bixler has indicated the defect in 
'I
James's view of religious experience.1 Religious experience 
for James is both too personal and too ineffable to function as 
a coherent aspect of value experience as a whole. As is well j1 
known, James's view of religious experience has little relationJI 
I ship to Royce's "spiritual communi ty•• or to Dewey "s "publictt. 
According to James's intended meaning, the criticism is valid. 
I Bixler, however, adds that for James religion is more than the 
I
I feeling that identifies it as such. Religion for James is also 
a distinct wav of life. Bixler compares the doctrine of fide-
ism in James with the function of the practical reason in Kant. 1 
I In Chapter III it will be shown that though this analogy is 
useful, it can be misleading from another frame of reference. 1 
Bixler in.tegrates religion with James •·s philosophy as a whole. !I 
I He indicates the relation of value experiences to a pluralistic 
1 
I ;;~;-th;-~~~t;;t-~f-personality, Burtt is left with the enti-
14. 
.ties of the "passional nature", "feeling", and "reasontt for 
which he can give no reasonable account. ~===== ~ For Brightman see SL, 43, 83. For Bixler see RPJ, _s_s_,_l-~0=8=.~========~ 
<-=--==== L__ ===-~~===-=======-==== =====--
philosophy as contrasted with the values present in monism. 
There will be more to say of Bixler's contributions in the 
chapter on value. 
iv. John Dewey. 
Dewey has called James "the most significant intellectual 
figure the United States has produced" •1 He attributes to 
James. even more than to Peirce, responsibility for forming a 
distinctively American philosophy and creed. Though Dewey sug-
gests the problem of significance, he does not clarify it. 
As II 
a system-builder, he has been more concerned with James•s con-
tributions to the movement of pragmatism than with interpreta-
tion of James's total meani~s. 
Dewey suggests that James~s seeming inconsistencies can-
not be resolved apart from the problems he faced. 2 One such 
problem was how to get the public to realize that certain prob-
lema have a real importance since the beliefs that ensue from 
them lead to different kinds of behavior. This, incidentally, 
seems to be a more coherent way of explaining why James used 
the essay form for particular problems rather than the reasons 
suggested by Santayana and Wright.3 
Dewey points directly to the focus in James's thinking 






1. Dewey, Pl4, 379. II 
2. Dewey, PC, 19ff. 
15. 
3. See Wright, HMP, 508. Wright suggests that James wrote es-
says because he was too ill to engage in a more disciplined in-
quiry. It is unfortunate that the essay should be frowned upon 
as a means of philosophical communication. Emerson. for exam-
ple has been treated as an "essayist" to be disposed of in 
freshman antholo ies. =======~~~= ==========================~=====~= 
aspect of "conduct", which simply means considering the person 
as a functional unity of his ideas and overt behavior. santay-
ana, Bixler, and Perry have also seen this contribution in 
James's writi~s. Unlike the traditional philosophers who 
divorced being from doing, and unlike the later behaviorists 
who denied being, James considered both aspects in his philo-
sophy and psychology. Personality and value for James are a 
I functional unity. As was suggested, this conception of the per-
son led to metaphysical pluralism, radical empiricism, and 
pragmatism. To i~ert this order is indeed a failure to under-
stand their place and function in James's thinking as a whole. 
Dewey, like Perry, emphasizes the unity between a psycho-
logical and philosophical treatment of the person for James. 
Dewey sees James's thinkine culminate in the doctrine of char-
acter which is a unity of the actual and the ideal. As is well 
known, this conception of character was fully developed in 
1 James's pupil, McDougall. Dewey also shows that James is 
among the first to clarify the meaning of the experiential pro-
cess and to conceptualize experience as a process of interpene-
tration rather than as sensation or ideation alone. Many think-
ers have achieved an understanding of Kant through Hegel rather 
than through Kant himself. This procedure of understanding a 
thinker in terms of his influences is true with respect to 
Dewey and James. 
~ ~---------------~---
' 1. See McDougall's Character and the Conduct of Life and Dew-
ey's Human Nature and Conduct. Rudolf Allers has published 
The Psychology_of Character from the Thomistic perspective as 
contrasted with the above ~vo that developed out of James. 
16. 
The further relevance of Dewey to James's interpretation 
of personality and value will be discussed in the fourth chap-
ter. The main points to be remembered now are (1) that Dewey 
suggests this frame of reference for understanding James and 
(2) that Dewey has been more concerned to establish the rela-
tionship and continuity between his thinking and that of James. 
v. Other Investigations. 
The selection of Santayana, Perry, Bixler, and Dewey is 
meant to suggest that these four have the most significant 
!
material pertinent to the aims of this thesis. It does not 
follow that other investi~ations have not been useful. With-
out the contributions of Royce, Allport, Boutroux, Brightman, 
IPost. Knox, and Wiener the purpose of this thesis could scarce-
ly be realized. It is appropriate to mention some of these 
contributions in passing. 
Royce points to James as the dominant figure in the Amer-
ican setting. Royce has seen the vital continuity of Edwards, 
Emerson, and James. Aoart from this cultural background, 
James's individual theories lose their value. Royce has also 
indicated how he and James confronted the problem of evil. He 
sees similarities in their purposes notwithstanding their op-
posed metaphysics. 1 
As was mentioned, Dr. Brightman has suggested the internal 
and external frames of reference and has also clarified what 
James meant by religious experience. Dr. Brightman has shown 
-----------~----~---
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that religious experience must be an intelligible communication 
of value.1 He also sees that conflict or problems is a funda- 1 
mental tact of life. Furthermore, he has observed James's con-
cern to find a unity in his philosophical perspective while 
respecting the complex order of experience.2 
Professor .~lport has shown how James's view of mind-body 
relations changed and how they affected his notion of person-
ality.3 He also sees Jamests "productive paradoxes" as mean-
ingful if not resolved in his wider view of the problem of 
personality.4 
Wiener has contributed to the present project in his trac-
i!l.'?:: of biological psychology and the rise of an organic theory 
of value.5 With Darwin as the base, Wiener finds common empha-
ses predominant in James and Dewey. The so-called "life-philo-
sophy" is a derivative from the psychology of these thinkers. 
Boutroux and Knox have considered James individually, while 
Flournoy has alluded to comparisons in Bergson and Renouvier. 
Roback's investigation,6 though concerned with James's "person-
ality, marginalia, and contributions", is inadequate. Until 
graphology and 11personalysis" become disciplined scientific 
methods, they cannot be used to substantiate any inquiry. 
11 There remains only to acknowledge relevant contributions 
II ~:_:~~:_:~::~:_:~:~ though unconcerned with James, have been 
1. Brightman, SL~ 83. 
2. Brightman, NV, 15, 88. 
3. Allport, Art.(l943), 97. 
4. Ibid. 
5. See Wiener, EFP, 35ff. 
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instrumental in their suggestions of methods and purpose. 
Koffka and Post have indicated the frame of reference of mean-
ing and significance.1 Professor Post has developed the con-
I struct of a "modern climate of opinion" and has offered many 
suggestions for a semantic and ideational analysis.2 
The final task prior to an interpretation of James is to 
present a summary review of the thesis and to mention several 
words pertinent to methods. 
4. A Survey of the Thesis. 
This thesis began with the purpose of extracting from 
James's thought those ideas relevant to a theory of personali-
ty and value. By this method of selection it hopes to systema-
tize those beliefs coherently with James's philosophical per-
spective. The thesis focuses upon the meaning of these ideas 
and their relative significance. In Chapter II, "James's In-
terpretation of Personality", the intended meanings will be 
sought for and then evaluated by an internal frame of refer-
ence. Chapter III, "The Basis of Value in Personality Accord-
ing to James". will follow essentially the same methods, em-
phasizing the theoretical and empirical unity between James's 
treatment of personality and the experience of value. The 
external frame of reference begins with Chapter IV, "An Evalua-
tion of James's Interpretation of Personality and Value". In 
that chapter the hypothesis of significance will be applied to 
-----~--------------1. See Koffka, PGP, I. 
2. From unpublished letters and conversation with the writer. 
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James's intended meani~s. It will also raise questions of 
external criticism with a view toward ascertaining the impor-
tance and value of the meaning involved. Chapter V, "Summary 
and Conclusions", will be a synoptic and organic treatment of 
the problems and their resolutions. The thesis will end with 
concl uding statements about James based upon the methods of 
meaning and evaluation. 
20. 
CHAPTER II 
JAMES'S INTERPRETATION OF PERSONALITY. 
1. Purpose of the Chapter. 
The broad purpose of this chapter is to ascertain the 
meaning of personality to William James. As was mentioned, this 
is an attempt at intended meanigg or "internal criticism". We 
must first discover what personality means to James and then 
see from his point of view whether he is consistent with his 
own assumptions and postulates. It is a test of inner coher-
ence as distinguished from significance which stresses external 
coherence. This method, like James's thinking, is synoptic 
and organic. James was no compartmentalist in any sense of the 
term. If any qualification can be 8iven to his thought, it is 
that his ethics concludes his psychology and that his metaphy-
sics is a linear result of his psychology and ethics. From the 
!psychological nature of habit. James moves to the ethical 
nature of character. From the psychological basis of experi-
ence, James develops the metaphysical basis for pluralism and 
a finite God. From empirical moral possibilities, James, like 
Kant, finds an argument for the belief in God. With a discus-
sion of value in Chapter III, therefore, this thesis will have 
achieved James's intended meaning of the whole man. 
It is fitting that this inquiry should follow James in 
his focus upon experience. Hence the basic task of this chap-
ter is to discover the experiences and areas of life that are 
21.. 
James's concern in his theory of personality. A second task is 
I to test for the accuracy and value of James's interpretations. 
II In the wider sense, this is the kernal of semantic discipline. 
This inquiry aims to clarify the areas of experience involved 
and then decide upon their significance. This two-fold criti-
cism avoids both extremes. It neither justifies James nor does 
ll it subordinate him to foreign standards. The partiality of 
this inquiry rests in methods alone. Since James's admitted 
preference was for ideas (feelings that culminate in behavior) 
rather than concepts (static symbols of ideas) this thesis will 
1 test for the total effect of those ideas. 
I As was mentioned, James's thinking on personality and val- · 
ue is linear. These subject matters are considered separately 
only for the convenience of emphasis and clarity. Actually, 
as the thesis progresses, each part will evolve into a more 
organic and coheren' account of personality. In other words, 
Jthe whole man is a unity of personality and value. For James 
as well as for modern (not to be confused with contemporary) 
personality theory, there is an emphasis upon experiential 
process, motivation, the self, perception, and value. These 
doctrines will be discussed and evaluated. In Chapter IV~ these 
evaluations will be compared with the dominant currents in 
modern thought. The present chapter will conclude with criti-
cisms of James that arise from his own assumptions, while the 
criticisms of Chapter IV will arise from a more comprehensive 
view of the facts. 
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2. The Psychology of Experience. 
1. Basic Factors in Experience. 
James's account of personality has as its starting-point 
the felt experience of activity. Unlike the "structuralists , 
James does not begin with a conception of· identity. Like the 
later "dynamic psychologists" James starts with a theory of 
motivation. James begins with the person who finds himself 
incomplete and dissatisfied within an incomplete and plastic 
world. It is a world of peril that acts upon the individual 
just as do objects and events. The "orimitive feelings" that 
these experiences elicit are the beginning inquiry for a study 
of personal!~. These feelings are in active relationship with 
nature or with other selves.1 Feeling "seems to depend for its 
physical conditions not on simple discharge of nerve currents, 
but on their discharge under arrest, impediment, or resist-
ance".2 Feeling is not contemplative thought, but purposeful 
and active experience. 
Experience thus begins in a world of problems, frustra-
tions, and needs to be satisfied. Evil and human needs alike 
are a stark reality for James. Within personality is a Binnen-
!~b~--what James calls the "dumb region of the heart". It 
is an empathic feeling for events, "an organ of communication 
with the nature of things".3 This ~en1eben or accumulative 
experience of needs, attitudes, and values is constantly 
--~~-~--~------~--~-1. See James, PP, II, 634ft. 
2. James, li:FM, 64, from "The Sentiment of Rationality". 
3. Ibid., 30-31, from ttis Life Worth Living?". 
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interpenetrating with its environments. The study of person-
ality thus begins with a recognition of the individual's pur-
poseful demands and total experiences that •press" upon the 
outer world and the objects and events that •impress" upon 
him.l. 
ii. The Nature of Feeling. 
Dictionaries and their specialized cousins that constitute 
the Worterbucher for philosophy and psychology are harassed by 
the slippery term feeling. The .American College DictionarY 
defines f eling as consciousness in itself without regard to 
11 thought or perceived object •2 Dorion Cairns defines feeling 
after Husaerl, as "non-intentional, •hyletic• process or 
statea".3 These definitions, though perhaps accurate, are of 
no help with James. 
I 
Since Aristotle, and including what Kurt Lewin has called 
1 
"Aristotelian modes of thought•,4 feeling has been defined in 
many ways. ith other than "Galilean modes of thought• these 
definitions have been invariably identified with the passions 
11 and senses. Aristotelian definition developed out of a tri-
chotomized notion of personality, namely tha~ feeling, cogni-
1 tion, and conation were distinct essences in the person. This 
reification peraists even 1n contemporary systems that assume 
the famous Platonic chariot horses of motivation and affection 
---~~--~------~~----1. See James, PP, II, 299ff. These conative and basic fac-
tors in experience are further discussed in the third section 
of this chapter. 
2. Text edition, 1948, 443. 
3. See Runes (ed.), ~' 108. 
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driven by the reason. 
It is necessary to ascertain James's intended meaning of 
feeling in order to understand the role he designates to it in 
his interpretation of personality. This thesis will attempt 
to follow James's synoptic development of the doctrine, first 
as it is suggested in the Principles, and secondly as it func-
tions in his wider view of personality and value. James's 
doctrine of feeling has its roots in what he calls the "psychol-
ogist's error" of freeing himself from the customs of practical, 
common sense. 1 Specifically, the error is the attention to 
and selection of interested facts to the neglect of the remain-
der of the empirical process. While the observer is sensitive 
to objects and crucial events, be neglects the passage of these 
events from one to the other. In the language made famous by 
James. such an observer flies from perch to perch, and is 
only aware of the perch rather than the passage. In another 
Jamesian distinction, these are the transitive and substantive 
states of consciousness. Feeling. for James. at least in the 
Pri~cioles. refers to the transitive parts of the stream rather 
than the substantive parts.2 
-------------------~ 1. James. PP. I, 196-199. 
2. Ibid., 243ff. James might answer something like the follow-
ing to the common-sense charge that a toothache or a bitter dis-
appointment is substantive rather than transitive: Both exam-
ples are instances of enduring feeling that is a continuous but 
changing process. According to common sense such experiences 
are felt as a repeated sensation or a recall of a static image. 
The facts of experience, however, indicate that experience is 
a duree real, and that feeling becomes more or less intense, 
more or less relational, and more or less significant. 
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These transitive states, or feeling, despite their ob-
scurity, are nonetheless there for the sensitive observer. As 
Perry interprets James, ~they are not only there in themselves, 
I but they qualify their \ermini---both the has-Just-been and the 
soon-about-to-be~.1 This discovery has a wide psychological 
I and philosophical significance. James •a intention with this 
doctrine is not to ascertain the limits of introspection, but 
to give a verifiable meaning to concepts that in traditional 
thought have been abstract and verbal. That is why Jamea is 
anti-conceptual in the traditional reference, bot deeply con-
I! cerned with verifiable concepts or ideas in his sense of the 
term. His intention is to trace experience back to its origi-
nal data and qualia. Feeling, in James and Whitehead alike, 
is a term used to designate these •originals".2 
I 
I 
James mentions the difficulty he had in finding a suitable 
term to convey this meaning. Sensation is too narrowly associ- i 
ated with the reception of physical data. Thought suggests 
the •omnipresence of cognition". James accepts the term feel-
i ing, though he denies its exclusive association with affection-
al states. In the same volume of his psychology James further 
says that we have no means of obJectively ascertaining whether 
our feelings react on our nerve processes or not•.3 Though 
1\ James is often quick to discern the organic components of~­
perience, he admits that of feeling we only are sore that it 
exists. Whether it bas a physical parallel is unknown and 
--------~----------~ 1. Perry, SWJ~ 81-82. 
2. See Whitehead, AOI, 297 and PR, 65-66. 
!=========~l~-..,13~· = James, PP, I, 448. 
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~ probably could not be verified or denied with present means 
I of inquiry. 
In his psychology, then, the nature of feeling is devel-
oped as an enrichment of conscious experience. It is the ap-
prehension of the in-itself" of some root character. As 
James says: 
through feelings we become acquainted with things, but 
only by our thoughts do we know about them. Feelings are 
the germ and stfrting point of cognition, thoughts the 
developed tree. 
Feeling thus corresponds to knowledge by acquaintance, 
the impression ~an object or event makes upon experience. 
Thought (which is a knowledge of relations) applies to know-
ledge by description.2 ith this intended meaning, the next 
task is to examine James's wider philosophy in order to discov-
er the specific role of feeling in personality and value. 
James's doctrine of feeling finds its complete expression 
in his ethical and religious writings. In his psychology, 
! feeling was identified as the fringe and transitive states of 
consciousness. In his other writings the doctrine becomes 
I 
II more explicit as immediate experience, embracing at once 
emotions, perceptions, sensations, and desires. The inter-
mediary point between James's psychology of feeling and his 
philosophy of feeling is evident in the following passage. 
James says: 
the actual unit is more probably the total mental state, 
the entire wave of consciousness or field of objects 
1. James, PP, I, 222. 
I 
2. Ibid., 259. For further references of James's doctrine of 






present to the thought at any one time; and second, to 
see that it is impossible to outline this wave, this 
field, with any definiteness ••• usually when we have a 
wide field we rejoice, for we then see masses of truth 
together, and often get glimpses of relations which we 
divine rather than see.l 
Feeling is thus a way of knowing, not in rivalry with in-
1 tellect, but as more comprehensive and more piercing of reality 
than intellect alone. Unlike Bergson who makes an absolute 
cleavage between intuitional and intellectual knowing, James 
uses the doctrine of feeling to indicate the unity and sensi-
1 ble continuity of experience. For James there is no empirical 
distinction between feeling and reason, for, all sense and 
emotion are at bottom but turbid and perplexed modes of what 
in its clarified shape is intelligent cognitione.2 Experience 
is a continuous process and feeling designates the comprehen-
siveness and directional character of this process. 
Perry says that for James, feeling is "more primordial 
than reason and of equal authority".3 He also denies Santay-
11 ana's claim that James is a romanticist. Perry probably means 
I by the former statement that feeling for James encompasses 
the whole process of experience whereas reason is but a speci-
alized part. 
Feeling has thus far been identified with the whole ex-





and v1ith relational consciousness. In the following passage 
James illustrates how feeling is also the basis of individualit~' 
---~----------------11. James, VRE, 226-227. 
2. James, EFM, 138, from ~eflex Action and Theismt. 
3. Perry, TCWJ, II, 327. 
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and personality. He says: 
individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of 
feeling, the darker, blinder, strata of character are 
the only places in the world in which we catch a real 
fact in the making and directly perceive how events hap-
pen, and how work is actually done.l 
In another passage James identifies feeling with the per-
ception of reality. Feeling, or "the inner state, is our very 
ll experience itself; its reality and that of our experience are 
II one" •2 Feeling is also the "deeper source of religion ,a and 
even God's knowledge is "constructed after the pattern of what 
in ourselves is called tmmediate feeling•.4 Feeling possesses 
a "native wholeness", 5 which is more "empathic and exciting thanll 
mere intellect".6 Reasoning itself is only "cogent for us 
when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been 
impressed in favor of the same conclusion".? 
The "sentiment of rationality" for James is a sentiment 
for feelings and subjective preference that lead to truth. 
Feeling, or the novelty of experience, indicates the "plus and 
thisness• that eludes the intellect. Belief in God is justi-
fied by feeling or the "immediate inner experience".8 James 
adds, however, that this belief must be submitted to the test 
of other truths. The feeling aspect of experience is also the 
source of moral obligation.9 With an awareness of James's 
--------------------1. James, VRE, 492. 
2. James, VRE, 489. 
3. Ibid., 422. See also 424. 
4. Ibid., 397. 
s. James, SPP, 92. See also 97. 
6. Ibid.' 47-48. 
7. James, VRE, 72-73. 
s. James, P.RA, 109. 
9. James, EFK, 49, from "Will to Believe". 
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insistence that experience is unified, continuous, and active, 1 
I
ll it seems reasonable that James should say that feeling pene-
trates to the heart of reality. Since James would admit of no j 
ultimate faculties in experience, it would be difficult to say 
how James juggles the classical elements of reason, feeling, 
and will. Since feeling has a different reference for James 
than it had for traditional personality theory, it does not 
seem that his emphasis on feeling can be labeled as an irra-
tionalism. According to Perry's interpretation of James, feel-
ing supplements logic, it does not nullify it.l 
iii. The Psychology of Ideation. 
As has been seen, experience for James refers to the 
whole psychological process of events that occur in interac-
tion with the subject and his environments.2 Consciousness 
is that sensitive area of awareness in experience. Feeling 
does not designate romantic pinings but indicates a qualita-
tive level of consciousness. Experience for James means ~ex­
perience of something foreign supposed to impress us whether 
spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and 
actsP.a Knowing for James constitutes the control of experien~ 
in favor of desired ends. Mind itself is characterized by the 
1. Perry, TC~, II, 700. 
a. See James, PP, II, 628, for a definition of experience in 
the context of "inner and outer relationsft. See James, PP, I, 
186, for a definition of feeling similar to that of conscious-
ness. An external clue to James's meaning of experience comes 
in one direction from Edwards and Emerson and in another direc-
tion from Darwin and Spencer. 
3. James, PP, II, 619. 
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"pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their 
attainment".1 The province of personality study is the area 
of interpenetration between self and nature or self and other 
selves. In James's words, it is where "minds inhabit environ-
ments which act on them and on which they in turn react".2 
With these emphases in mind, the next step toward tracing 
James's development of a theory of personality, is to see his 
account of the psychology of ideation. 
!' As is well known, James is a famous advocate of the "mor-
al life". One can suspect, and rightly so, that if James dis-
lmisses the tenets of rationalism, then he will substitute a 
,new scheme of inquiry and verification. That scheme will be 
1 sure to follow from his organic interpretation of experience 
and feeling. James finds such a substitute in the meaning of 
ideas; "live-options" that give direction to experience. 
James's psychology of ideas is related to what he believes 
are the implications of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge 
about. The object is immediately presented or felt in know-
ledge by acquaintance. In knowledge about, the object is known 
mediately by means of ideas, or what James figuratively calls 
the "theorizing faculty". The function of an idea in knowledge 
is not to reproduce or "apprehend" the object, but to prepare 
for and lead the way to the object. For James the meaning of 
lan idea cannot be determined by its origin in concepts as waa 
11 done by traditional idealists, or in sensations as was done by 
1--------------------1. James, PP, I, 8. 
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the early empiricists. The meaning of an idea is found in 
consequences, in the results that ensue when that idea is 
entertained. Truth itself for James "is only the expedient in 
our way of thinking".l James defines truth as "a class name 
for all sorts of definite working principles of experience".2 
Ideas are expectations that culminate in experience, they are 
I not termini in themselves. Ideas are of value in that they 
enable the person to deal intelligibly with his existing situa-
tion. The final justification for all ideas, like their mean-
ings, is to be found not in their origin or logical structure, 
but in the service they render to the person.3 
If the student is sensitive to what James is trying to 
1
1 accomplish with his psychology of ideas, then his complete in-
tended meaning can be grasped. One such task that James con-
fronts is how he can explain mind in terms of purposeful ex-
perience and thinking, rather than as a "lump" whose locus is a 
mystery. The clue to James's view of the meaning of ideas 
therefore, lies in his characterization of experience as a per-
sonal, dynamic, process that begins with needs to be satisfied 
and problems to be resolved.4 Thinking is not an ethereal leap 
for the will-o-the-wisp. Thinking only exists because it does 
something instrumental toward the security and well-being of the 
person. For James, thinking is a guide to conduct, not a 
---~--~--~----------1. James, PRA, 46. 
2. Ibid., 68. 
3. James, SPP, 57ff. 
1 
4. For further references to James's meaning of the psycholog-
ical nature of experience see James, EFM, 131, 308-309 and 
James, PP, I, 222-223. 
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terminus that can be studied independently of the needs, val-
l uea, and goals of the person. ith the adoption of ideas comes 
the ideating for means to realize the purposes of those ideas. 1: 
Thinking is a process of visualizing the means that ensue from 
particular beliefs and values. In brief, thinking is an in-
quiry. As James describes the origin of thinking, "belief and 
doubt are living attitudes, and involve conduct on our part 
I to gratify an inner need11 • 1 
I Ideas are further characterized by James according to 
their concreteness, utility, and instrumentality toward achiev-
ing goals. Where concepts have (traditionally) referred to ab-
stract and universal symbols, ideas refer to "mediate know-
ledge" that is both particular and individually achieved. This 
individual origin of ideas and the necessary critical inquiry 
that must be made by each person erects the platform for a 
metaphysical pluralism. 
Ideas are thus empirical relations to the whole of experi-
ence while concepts for James are specialized abstractions. 
When James says that ideas have a "warmth and intimacy" to 
which no object of mere conception ever attains, he means that 
ideas are organic and vital to personality. Ideas are felt 
and experienced, but never completely conceptualized or repro-
duced in language. Ideas are the creative synthesis of sub-
ject-object relationships while concepts have a static refer-
ence.2 
I. James, Efi4 24-25, from "Is Life Worth Living?~. 
2. In "The Place of Affectional Facts", James alludes to the 
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personal and purposeful eharat"ter of ideas as distinguished 
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Ideas for James are thus the substitute for the "rigor 
and vigor" of logic that life eludes. Whether that substitute 
is accurate and successful must be decided upon by external as 
well as internal criticism. In the next section ideas will be 
discussed as they evolve into intelligence, and the role James 
designates to intelligence in personality. 
iv. The Nature of Intelligence. 
1th experience as the key to James's interpretation of 
personality, the meanings of feeling, reason, conception, and 
ideas have become clear. Within the framework of the "psycho-
logy of experience" there remains only to discuss how ideas 
are used in conduct and their possibilities for the realization 
of value. Though motivation for James is both experiential 
and non-conscious, the topic is reserved for separate treat-
ment in order to emphasize the continuity between non-con-
scious and ideal motivation. 
Perry characterizes James as writing a "biological psy-
chology" because of the Darwinian element in his thought.1 
Perry refers to the emphases James placed upon the meaning of 
adjustment and the role of personality in relation to its 
environments. Other writers like Dewey and Herzberg have shown 
how James enlarged upon the Darwinian conception of adjustment 
that implied a submission to nature.2 Adjustment for James 
1. See Perry, TCWJ, (BV), 66-73, for a condensation of this 
influence. See in the same volume 339-341, for a comparison 
of the Darwinian influence on Bergson and James. 
2. See James, VRE, 131, where he suggests that the "sick soul" 
believes in a passive psychology of adjustment, while the 
"healthy soul" believes in possibilities for altering the en-
vironment. 
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is an active process.1 It is directly related to ideas and in-
telligence. Adjustment entails an acknowledgment of the de-
mands of nature but for James it is also an accommodation of 
nature to personal needs, values, and purposes. Indeed, ac-
commodation is "what makes life significant" and "worth liv-
ing". Adjustment is a "resistance of the ego to the world~, 2 
as well as "actions ••• done for an end, and show a choice of 
3 
means". Adjustment is a personal affair, founded upon the in-
dividual Weltanschauung. As James says: 
the philosophy which is so important in each of us is not 
a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of 
what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly 
got from books; it is our individual way of just seeing 
and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos.4 
A notion of reality is always implied in the conception 
I of adjustment. Reality for James is not a ready-made plenum 
in which the individual participates. Like truth, "reality is 
II in the making". Because it is amenable to human purpose, real-
ity has a "practical character".5 Similarly, personality is 
not a lump entity but is an involvement consisting of the in-
1 I dividual's impressions from and his contributions to his en-
vironments. This is the long way of saying that the locus of 
personality is experiential process and that "reality is an 
1 ~--~~---------------l. See Henry James, LWJ, I, 215, where William James says that 
his uquarrel with Spencer is not that he makes much of the 
environment, but that he makes nothing of the glaring and po-
tent fact of subjective interests which cooperate with the 
environment in moulding intelligence". (1878) 
2. See Ibid., 148, from a notebook entry dated April 30, 1870. 
3. James, PP, I, 11. 
4. James, PBA, 4. 




The "will to believe•• ia some of James's evidence favor-
ing hie conception of the practical character of reality. It 
is one of the most criticized doctrines in his philosophy. 
Irrespective of the objective merit of that doctrine, it is 
important to note that the will to believe was crucial to 
James's interpretation of the whole man. James used this doc-
trine to overcome the determinism of both materialistic mech-
anism and monistic idealism. Some critics like Turner have 
erroneously isolated this doctrine from James's conception of 
the person.2 As such, they have been able, like Russell, to 
condemn the doctrine as an "ineffective rationale". It would 
seem that a more coherent interpretation could arise from 
James's intended meaning as well as a recognition of ita em-
Pirical context. 
Aa is well known, philosophers and psychologists alike 
have been occupied with the problem of the unity of person-
ality. In traditional thought this unity was conceptualized 
as a substratum self or soul that persevered throughout chang-
ing experiences. James's treatment of the problem of the "one 
and the many" is also well known. Leas known is that James 
specifically tried to account for this supposed unity. Unity 
for James is not a timeless state but a process.3 Unity is 
Achieved and is not an inherent trait. Unity is furthermore 
relative; it is not an either/or. Most important, unity is 
---~---------~-----~ l. James, ERE, xiii. 
2. See Turner, WJP, 11-21. 
3. James, SPP, 130-134. 
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not a phenomenal conception, but is an orsanization achieved 
lby intelligible, coherent methods of belief and action. In a 
passage that will also be relevant for James's interpretation 
of the self, James says: 
the very Self or ego of the individual comes in this way 
to be viewed no longer as the pre-existing source of re-
presentations, but rather as their last and most compli-
cated fruit.~ 
The function of the will to believe in James's interpre-
l' tation of personality is, then, to unify the person by the se-
1 lection and ~ecution of intelligible beliefs. For James this 
function reaches its highest use with the question of belief 
in God. James's argument to favor his position can be summa-
lrized as followsa there is no theoretical, conclusive proof 
that prevents belief in God and the significance of human val-
ues. Similarly, there is much practical evidence to warrant 
such beliefs. If a belief in God leads to a reinforcement of 
purpose, an integration of the moral life; if that belief en-
sues in good conduct, then that belief is justified. As James 
saw his problem, he tried to make religious and moral faith 
coherent with the rest of experience. The will to believe is 
thus the right to believe; the criticism of belief in order to 
determine the precise conditions under which a person could 
act intelligibly on the basis of partial evidence.2 
I James was quick to qualify what he meant by the right of 
1 
the "passional nature" to decide upon options that were open 
1. James, PP, I, 2. 




to necessary preferential behavior.1 He rejects autism, saying 
that: 
the will to believe cannot be stretched as far as that. 
We can make ourselves more faithful to a belief of which 
we have the rudiments, but we cannot create a belief out 
of whole cloth when our perception actively assures us of 
its opposite.2 
The significance of this statement is important to an un-
derstanding of what James means by personality. He says im-
11 plicitly that individuals are always obliged to act. One must 
live and act, he would say, but how one acts is many times a 
matter of choice. Many choices must be made in this world of 
peril. Royce spoke about the choice of loyalty to an ideal. 
James speaks of loyalty to the consequences that can be altered 
by adopting an intelligible belief. This, to James, is a 
process of looking away from first things and principles to 
last things and consequences. The point to be emphasized is 
that since belief and ideas are an experiential (or experimen-
tal) expression of personality, then they should be used to 
control conduct. Few interpreters of James have detected this 
element of Stoicism in his thought. 
The will to believe is unscientific because it cannot de- 1 
cide upon scientific (or metaphysical) truths. It is not anti- 1 
scientific because it is concerned with practical, phenomenal 
results, and not theoretical ultimate results.3 James suggests 
., --~-----------------1. See James, EFM, 42, from "The Will to Believe". It might 
not be beyond justifiable interpretation to say that for James 
man is not a ttrational animal..- but a ttselective animal .... 
2. James, VRE, 208. 
3. See James, SPP, 22lff. 
that when one type of inquiry has been pushed to its limits, 
(i.e., what was scientific method in his day) an individual 
could still engage in reflective inquiry of another type. Cer-
tainly it requires no more evidence or faith to believe in 
1 Spencer's "Unknowable than it does to believe in God. To 
James this pragmatic will to believe was only "empiricism 
stretched to its limits". The will to believe is the right to 
believe in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary. 
James believed, and rightly so, that an experiential test 
1 had to be made when the needs of life demand activity. Since 
ideas are creative, James thought that he saw a way to make a 
functional operation out of thinking. Dissatisfied with the 
I 
Summum Bonum of contemplation, James sought to establish a 
moral life built on participation.2 
In summary it may be said that by intended meaning the in-
telligible basis for personality in James's writings has been 
found. The nature ot experience, feeling, and the meaning of 
ideas have aided in the clarification ot the meaning of intel-
ligence to James. That James believed traditional concepts to 
be limited is well known. Though less quoted, James's use of 
cognition and conception occupy a vital part in intelligence. 
In the Principles James says that conceptions ~elp us, by 
riasoning, to know new truths about individual th1ngstt.3 In 
~he Pragmatism James asserts that •in our cognitive as well as 
I ...... --~-----------,_~~---
1. James, VRE, 17. 
2. See Perry, SWJ, 170ft, for a similar interpretation. 
3. James, PP, I, 479-480. 
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I our active life we are creative .1 Conception for James is the 
important theorizing facultyrt, that "functions exclusively for 
I the sake of ends that do not exist at all in the world of im-
pressions we receive by way of the senses•.2 For James, then, 
conception and theorizing are decidedly instrumental toward in-
tell~ible human conduct. Science as James knew it was ex-
tremely limited. Philosophy in his day was barren speculation. 
And it cannot be denied that James sought for a guide to human 
affairs in his doctrine of intelligence.3 Whether this guide 
1 is sufficient from James's point of view, and from a more com-
prehensive perspective, are problems for a later discussion. 
3. The Psychology of Motivation. 
This thesis has already discussed what might be the role 
of •cognition" in James's interpretation of personality. With 
a consideration of emotion and conation, the traditional sche-
ma of personality theory will be approached. James•s psycho-
1 logy marks a turning point for such theory. Up to his time, 
~~ and with few exceptions afterwards, philosophers and psycholo-
gists were concerned with the two horses and chariot driver 
!within the person. The •conatus" is the classical entrance 
---~~~-----~-----~-~ 1. James, PBA, 257. 
2. James, EFII, 117, from "Reflex Action and Theism". 
3. It may be useful in the absence of a definition of intel-
11 
ligence by James to formulate one according to his intended 
meaninas. Intelligence is the creative, experiential funct!on 
of attempting to control future experience by the application 
of inquiry based upon needs to be satisfied in relation to the 
possible courses of action. For reference see James, VRE, 13-
14, 256, and 324, and also his definition of the mental in the 
preface to his Principles. 
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into motivational theory just as concepts provide the tradi-
tional route into cognition. The case is much different with 
James. 
As was shown, the experiential flux is dominant in James's 
interpretation of personality. By internal criticism one can 
only say that certain experiences seem to be more or less char-
acterized by different qualities. For James, "conduct, and not 
sensibility is the ultimate fact". 1 though all experience is 
at the same time affective, volitional and cognitive, it is 
convenient to name and distinguish among the predominant ten-
dencies. For James, however, the naming of these experiences 
does not indicate a structural parallel.2 Being hungry dis-
turbs the whole personality, not merely the stomach. It is 
not the mind that lies dormant while the alimentary tract ful-
fills its needs. Every activity encompasses the whole of the 
person.3 This principle of wholeness is perhaps what leads 
Bixler and Perry to say that James suggested the basis for an 
organic theory of value, rather than a treatment unrelated to 
the person. 
What meaning, then, can motivation have for James, and 
what is its relation to personality? Motivation for James is 
ideals and sense data alike, anything that stimulates human 
behavior to interpenetrate with nature and other selves.4 
~-~-~--------~-----~ 1. James, EFM, 174, from ~The Dilemma of Determinism". 
2. James, PP, II, 398, 472. 
3. James, VRE, 321. 
4. Here again the present writer is trying to crystallize some 
related strands in James's thinking by defining concepts per-
haps unknown to James but certainly within his frame of refer- 1 
========~~e~n~c~e~·==For references see James PP II, 307, 449, 559. 
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otives are not merely the instincts and physical needs, but 
include all stimulants toward activity. That is the essence 
of James's so-called "hormic" psychology. Motives can occur 
1 with the "marriage, namely, of some unhabitual ideal ••• with 
some fidelity". 1 
I In a word, anything meaningful in experience and instru-
mental toward desired ends that stimulates activity to realize 
that end, can be a motive. 
Other investigations, like that of Herzberg and Bertocci,2 
have clarified the meaning of will and its relation to instinct 
and emotion. These topics, of course, constitute James's 
thinking on motivation in the Principles. It is not necessary 
to repeat these investigations for several reasons. In the 
first place any standard manual in psychology presents a de-
ll tailed treatment of James's theory of emotion and instinct. 
Secondly, writers like Bertocci have done a thorough job of 
explaining what the will means to James. Thirdly, the student 
can find no better interpreter than James himself to explain 
these individual doctrines. The justification for adding to 
these interpretations is that they have not told the whole 
story. While they have made a minute analysis of the will, 
they have not rela.ted it to personality nor have they looked 
to James's other writings for motivational theory. The frame-
work of personality is broader and more loyal to James's in-
1 tended meaning. It recognizes that James would not encapsulate 
--~-----------------
42. 
1. James, EFM, 308-309, from •What Makes Life Significant?". 
II 2. See Bertocci, Art. (1946) and =H=e=r=z=-b-=e=rg=, =p=w;=~='=9=2=f=f=.=====#====..;:= 
motivation in a gland, instinct, or an agency of will. Moti-
vation for James is as comprehensive as experience. Following 
the procedure of intended meaning, the next task is to see 
what James is trying to do with the conception of motivation in 
his theory of personality. 
James's main problem in motivational psychology can be con 
densed as follows: Can the idea of God and a moral order, or 
any ideal for that matter, influence and motivate personality 
as strongly as does the need for esteem?1 From another per-
spective his problem is to determine if ideals can have a 
1 ~cash-value" in terms of human experience.2 Granted that the 
acceptance of an ideal will lead to favorable consequences, 
how can persons be loyal to this ideal and have their behav-
ior conform to the conditions that can realize this ideal? It 
is more than a matter of calling upon some mystical will to 
achieve this result. To James it is more a problem of finding 
a method, not a faculty, whereby persons themselves will choose 
to act in accordance with intelligence and control. That me-
thod, as has been seen, is the method of intelligence. The 
importance of this method notwithstanding, James well realized 
that to know the truth is one thing, and to act upon the truth 
is another. He is aware that though virtue is knowledge, that 
not all knowledge is virtue. 
James makes no pretence to answer this age-old problem. 
He stresses the nature of intelligence and the significance of 
--------------------1. See James, PP, I, 293ff and 296ff, also James, EFM, 323ff. 





motivation, indicating two clues to clarify the relationship 
between them. One is that a motive is something meaningful in 
experience. As James says, 11both thoughts and feelings are 
determinants of conduct".l Another is that a motive is instru-
mental toward the achievement of desired ends. James's essays 
are as rewarding for motivational theory as is his psychology. 
j Evidence that indicates James's concern to relate 
J to intelligence within the context of personality 
one of his latest papers. James says that: 
motivation 
is found in 
we ought somehow to get a topographic survey made of the 
limits of human power in every conceivable direction ••• 
the limits of power must be limits that have been realized 
in actual persons, and the various ways of unlocking the 
reserves of power must have been exemplified in individual 
lives.2 
For James then, the problem of how persons are motivated 
is the historical problem belonging to psychology proper. As 
will be shown in the next chapter, James unites this problem 
to the problem of how persons can be motivated. His purpose 
is to indicate the organic continuity of all behavior, that all 
II motives are "instinctive springs of vitality" arising when 
"need and struggle dominate".3 James's first purpose was to 
relate motivation to intelligence. His second purpose was to 
. relate those in turn to the personality. His third purpose is 
to justify the moral life. As was seen, James could only do 
II this by indicating that motivation is at least partially con-
trollable by the method of intelligence. His prime evidence 
~ --~----~------------1. James, VRE, 494. 
2. James, Art.(l907) partially reprinted in Perry, TCWJ,I,271. 
;=======~' a. J-amesct _ s 
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to indicate this control lies in the relationship between ao-
tives and needs. Motives for James are inspired not merely by 
physical needs as Spencer suggests, but also by "the interest 
and importance that experiences have for us, by the emotions 
they excite, and the purposes they subserve, by their affective 
value, in sbort".l 
For James the very pulse of personality lies in the ~risks 
and heroisms of life't. It is another way of saying that one 
should act in accordance with needs, controlled by intelli-
gence.2 Personality itself is made human in proportion to the 
quality and significance of needs. James illustrates this when 
he says: 
man's chief difference from the brutes lies in the exuber-
ant excess of his subjective propensities--his preemin-
ance over them simply and solely in their number and in 
the fantastic and unnecessary character of his wants, phy-
sical, moral, aesthetic, and intellectual.3 
Values, then, as well as motives have their origin in hu-
man · needs. Man is religious not by a lien he holds upon the 
cosmos, but because of his desire to achieve certain ends. The 
interpenetration of needs, motives, values, and the method of 
intelligence forms the keynote to James's theory of personality. 
It is a step closer to the whole man. After perception and the I 
self have been related to personality, the chapter will close 
with some summary statements and criticisms of James that de-
velop out of his own postulates. In the next chapter, James's 






character and the moral life, thus completing the survey of the 
whole man. 
4. Perception and the Self. 
i. Perception. 
Perception and the self are the final topics within the 
framework of this chapter. These, together with the psychology 
of experience and motivation constitute the main emphases con-
ducive to James's intended meaning. In the next chapter these 
1 topics will be reconsidered from the perspective of the whole 
meaning and significance of personality. II 
As was mentioned, James's views on the self and perception 
are widely known. The dictum that consciousness is selective, 
sensibly continuous, personal, and referential is memorized by 
every student of philosophy and psychology. Similarly, James's 
treatment of the self has worked its way into an aphoristic 
psychology. "Only the passing thought is the thinker." "A 
man has as many social selves as there are individuals who 
recognize him." 11The self is a fighter for ends." 
The present problem is to clarify by internal criticism 
I
. the complete intended meaning of these doctrines. It is be-
llieved that such criticism will suggest a new interpretation of 
James. While other investigations have stressed perception as 
an epistemological problem and the self as an ontological prob-
lem, this project will try to ascertain their meaning and role 
in personality. 
_____ Q~~~!-!P~~!~~§~_!Jke those of Bixler and MCLeod, 1 have 
==~l=. _ Qp, c~t=·====================================================#-~~~~ 
indicated that for James, human conduct is personal and autono-
mous. From the personal they say that personality is autono-
mous, i.e., that personal qualities within the individual con-
stitute the essence of human conduct. There is much truth to 
this statement. James repeats in many fashions that "experi-
ence is what I agree to attend to".l 
The hypothesis of the present inquiry is that James is 
trying to indicate that perception is a dynamic function medi- 1 
ating between personality and the environment.2 In the modern 
I 
idiom, perception is for James "the first line of defense" by 
adjusting and accommodating the organism to its environments. 
The immediate task is to see if James himself substantiates 
this hypothesis. 
The main emphasis in the chapter "Perception of Reality" 
of the Principles, is that perception, motivation, and reality 
are inextricably interwoven. By this emphasis James means 
that perception is not a mechanical apperception of the Q!sg-
an-sich. Nor is it Mill's "mental chemistry" synthesizing dis-
crete sensations. Perception is a function in conduct that 
integrates and harmonizes individual needs and values with the 
nature. Throughout the chapter James asserts that reality de-
pends upon persons.3 He equally emphasizes that persons depend 
upon an environment. That personality is autonomous is thus a 
half truth. Interaction or interpenetration is the key to 
--------------------1. James, PP, I, 402. 
2. See James, EFM, 12-13, 20. 
3. In addition to James, PP, II, 283-323, see also James, PU, 
56, 287, and James, ERE, llff, 82ff, and 2llff. 
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James's meaning of personality. Neither nature nor personality 
is meaningful without participative human conduct. 
As is well known, reality for James is a perpetually un-
finished process. Less known is that James considers any pre-
1 dication of reality unintelligible that is void of personality. 
11 "Reality is a sort of feeling", 1 not a conception of catego-
ries. In the same context James adds that "whatever excites 
and stimulates our interest is real". Reality is thus pro-
duced by experience and nature. Either alone is void of mean-
ing. The prime reality in conduct is perception and belief. 
For James they are active processes in adjustment--they for-
mulate the real and the ideal. As James says: 
that theory will be most generally believed which, besides 
offering us objects able to account satisfactorily for our 
sensible experience, also offers those which are most 
interesting, those which appeal most urfently to our 
aesthetic, emotional, and active needs. 
II 
'I 
The psychological or experiential is thus the real. It is 
a "fusion" of needs, values, attitudes and the external events 11 




answers those who would oppose a metaphysical reality to pheno-
menal reality. He says: 
as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as 
such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of 
the term ••• the inner state is our own very experience41t-self; its reality and that of our experience are one. 
1! -----~~~-~~~~-:~_::rsonality is an observation of perceptual 
1. James, PP, II, 639. See also I, 161. Also note similari-
ty to Whitehead. 
2. James, PP, II, 312. 
3. James, EFM, 306, from "What Makes a Life Significant?". 
4. James, VBE, 489. 
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I 
behavior and reality. This does not mean that James offers 
an extreme individual psychology. James realizes that social 
experiences as well as individual ideas have a voice in truth. 
His emphasis is not on individualism, but rather is an insis-
tence that human science cannot subordinate experiential proc-
ess to the demands of a rigid experimental or "brass psycholo-
gy". 
ii. The Self. 
There are two hypotheses of the present inquiry relevant 
to the self. The first is that for James the self is a per-
ception, it is known rather than a knower. By the method of 
internal criticism it will be seen that the self void of per-
ception is meaningless and that perception without the self de-
nies the empirical evidence. As a sub-hypothesis it might be 
added that for James the self has no existence outside of its 
interaction with its environments. The second hypothesis is 
that through James's notion of the self arises a novel meaning 
of personality---one that other interpreters have missed. More 
specifically, the hypothesis is that through the notion of the 
self, James is seen not to be writing a psychology of indivi-
duality at all. Much less is he concerned to focus on genius, 
mystics and other extreme cases as the basis for his study of 
personality. This is evident in James's ideas of the social 
self and the moral self. His first intent is to show that the 
social self is enhanced by prestige, esteem and other ego-val-




!whole purpose is to indicate the growth of the social self into 
the moral self--a growth process from individual to social and 
religious values.1 The first hypothesis can be explained in 
this section while the second hypothesis constitutes the mater-
lial discussed in the next chapter. 
As is well known, James doubts an underlying unity or 
substratum to experience. Because of this, Whitehead feels 
that James has not provided "an adequate account of this un-
doubted personal unity, maintaining itself amidst a welter of 
circumstances". 2 Merrington's complaint has already been noted. 
What meaning can these criticisms have in view of James's em-
pirical method and agnosticism? The intended meaning must be 
obtained before this question can be answered. 
The influence of Darwin upon James's notion of the self is 
of prime importance. For one, save for the experience of memo- I 
'• 
I 
ry, James could posit no personal unity preserved throughout 
change, since experience is perilous, uncertain, and constantly 
changing. Variety and conflict are ever present. James did 
not see his task as incorporating an ontology into a psychology. 
For him, the "inferred self" or soul consists mainly of thorac-
ic and cranial movements. Like Mead, who followed James, James 
found evidence only for a social self. This is the perceived 
self, and though "only a succession of fields 0 , 3 it is the most 
vivid and personal of all perceptions. For James the phenomenal 
j i:--F~;-;;f;;;~~;-t~ the latter hypothesis see James, EFM, 26- I 
27, 201, 208, and James, VRE, 256. For reference to the former 
hypothesis see James, PP, I, 218-220 and James, ERE, 2, 3. I 
so. 
1
2. Whitehead, AOI, 240. I 
3. James, VRB, 192. -+-----
empirical self is 
the hot place of a man's consciousness, the group of ideas 
to which he devotes himself, and from which hf works, call 
it the habitual centre of his working energy. 
It experience is the sole locus of inquiry, and if the 
method of inquiry is experiential testing, then there is no 
evidence for an identity beyond the facts. The self that 
Merrington and Whitehead ask for constitutes "fleeting aspir-
ations Lthat_7 are mere whimsy".2 There is no apparent advan-
tage to burdening inquiry with an unverifiable construct. The 
self as known suggests every basis for controlled inquiry into 
human behavior. This self is "the expanding centre of a human 
character".a It is an empirical not a logical construct. Val-
uable and lovable as an enduring entity of self might be, the 
facts deny its existence. The only identity in human conduct 
is that which is achieved through a progressive interpenetra-
tion with nature.4 Aa was mentioned, perceptual organization 
1 is the only unity James posits in personality. Unity is an 
achievement and the self is the complicated fruit derived 
from intelligible human conduct. 
There are many clues from the PsYchology to substantiate 
the present hypothesis. In the first chapter James says that 
"no actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice 
of eans, can be called indubitable expressions of mindn.5 In 
-~~--~--~~-~-~~-----1. James, VRE, 193. See also 201. 
2. Ibid., 191. 
3. James, PU, 262. 
4. See James, ERE, 55ft. 
5. James, PP, I, 11. (Italics those of present writer.) Cf. 
similarity to Royce's teleological view of mind. 
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terms of self, this means that identity or ego-perception de-
velops and is not innate. It furthermore develops in accor-
dance with anticipated conduct and the control of certain ex-
periences to realize desired ends. The self has no meaning 
outside of this interaction with its environments.1 Self, like 
mind, is an activity not a structure. 
that 
This interaction is again expressed by James when he adds 
to have a self that I can care for, nature must first pre-
sent me with some obJect interesting enough to make me 
instinctively wish to appropriate it for its 2wn sake.2 
The self is thus an empirical perception---truly a line of 
defense between the organism and the environments. On the same 
page, James further qualifies the experienced self. He says: 
the words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feel-
ing and connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designa-
tions, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the pow§r to 
produce ••• excitement of a certain peculiar sort.3 
The self, then, is a vivid perception produced by the in-
dividual in accordance with his specific experiences. To James 
it is purposeful in adjustment and the key to moral conduct as 
shall be seen in the following chapter. 
5. Internal Criticisms. 
Someone has said that James never placed a great value 
upon consistency. Perhaps, like Emerson, James believed that 
--~--~~-~--~--------1. See Dewey's essay "The Vanishing Subject in the P ychology 
of William James", for a similar interpretation, reprinted in 
Dewey, PM, 396-407. 
2. James, PP, I, 319. 
3 • Ibid. t 319. 
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"a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small mindsn.l Cer-
tainly James's inconsistencies have been noted along with his 
individual doctrines. The present task is to ascertain Justi-
fiable internal criticism of James's interpretation of person-
ality. The purpose is to expose the predominant weaknesses in 
James's interpretations in order to clarify precisely what 
James has achieved and what be has failed to achieve. 
There are three major criticisms that follow from James's 
interpretation of personality. There is first of all a con-
tradiction of emphases. Secondly, there is weakness in James's 
method of intelligence, and finally, there are pronounced am-
biguities concerning James's interpretation of the self. 
The brilliance of James's interpretation of personality 
lies in his rejection of musty, classical doctrines, his inter-
pretation of a biological psychology, and his able position 
favoring the moral life. In the classical tradition Reason 
was located in the head while feeling originated in the vis-
cera. James was among the first to show the continuity of the 
experiential flux and the contributions of feeling to con-
sciousness. He is credited by Muller-Freienfels as being the 
originator of a "psychomotortt psychology. As was seen, the 
psychology of experience provided the key to James's interpre-
tation of personality. 
James's psychology, however, tends toward contradictory 
emphases. Notwithstanding the sentiment of rationality, 
James's chapter on reasoning begins with percepts and ends with 
-~---~-~------~----~ 1. Emerson, Works, 21. 
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the concepts that he rejects in other contexts. Notwithstand-
ing his emphasis upon the personal and selective factor in per-
ception and its relation to needs and interests, James empha-
sizes in his chapters on perception the stimulus-receptive 
structure and neural pathways to the neglect of his wider 
functional meanings. Although James frequently emphasizes the 
experience and will of an ideal, his chapter on habit focuses 
upon central and motor mechanisms. James violates his own 
principle of the continuity of experience. In his essay, "Does 
Consciousness Exist?", James stresses the sensory matrix of 
experience, neglecting its interpenetrating and personal char-
acter. The Varieties emphasize the extremely personal and 
mystical nature of experience, contradicting other equally valid 
emphases that experience is psychomotor and biosocial. 
James's Gifford Lectures are significant as an early at-
tempt to explain the normal through the abnormal. This empha-
sis is scarcely found in the lTinciples. These faults are by 
no means fatal. While they illustrate contradictory motifs in 
James's thought, they also indicate his genius and comprehen-
sive thought. Such a dilemma points to the value of an inter-
nal frame of reference in order to understand James's inter-
1 retation of personality. 
i. Is the will to believe an existential postulate? 
As has been seen, the will to believe belongs within the 
context of the method of intelligence. It is not an isolated 
doctrine nor can it be evaluated external to its context. 
54. 
James has stressed a method of intelligence to ascertain co-
herent behavioral involvements. This is indeed one of his en-
during contributions to personality theory. Nevertheless there 
are internal difficulties in that doctrine that must be exposed. 
These difficulties originate with the nature of ideas in 
James's philosophy. According to him, ideas are true in so 
far as they are instrumental in establishing satisfactory rela-
tions with other areas of experience. Ideas are ~ true 
when they serve this end and •if the consequences useful to 
life flow from it•.l suitable example of this inherent 
weakness is found in James's position on belief in God. Though 
that example belongs more properly to an inquiry ibto the 
philosophy of religion, it is useful here for several reasons. 
In the first place James himself usee that illustration to test 
the method of intelligence. Secondly, it would seem that it 
I 
the method is accurate and successful in this instance, then 
the method would be accurate in other cases. Similarly, a 
weakness exposed here indicates a weakness of the method, not 
its application to particular examples alone. 
James says that Hif the hypothesis of God orks satisfac-
torily in the widest sense of the word, it is true".2 What 
referent is designated by this statement? The hypothesis 
simply means (by James's own intention) that someone needs to 
believe in God and values the belief in God. The hypothesis 
a serts nothing as to the existence of God. This hypothesis 
1. James, PBA, 273. 
2. Ibid.' 299. 
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cannot say whether God is a finite person, or a demon who lives 
on Mount Olympus. In a word, the hypothesis has no existential 
value. 
other criticisms of this doctrine are well known. en 
James says that an idea is true if it works, and that an idea 
!is good if it works, he fails to contront the meaning of true 
and good. He fails to make an explicit, experiential inquiry 
into what is good and what effects will ensue from a given be-
, lief. These inquiries must be made before he can qualify any 
judgment as good or true. 
The basic difficulty with this doctrine is that James is 
really unclear on the nature of perceptual experience. When 
he implies that perception mediates between the environments 
and the person, he simply proceeds to ignore the effective 
ability of the environment to mold perception. His confusion 
of need and perception as distinguished from truth is evident 
even with the pragmatist's standard of •warranted assertabil-
ity~. James's failure here is not complete. He did not in-
tend to advance a novel argument for the existence of God. His 
purpose was to illustrate how that belief could be Justified. 
His failure is relative rather than absolute. In failing to 
ork out a specific method of intelligence that could unify 
the realm of logic with the realm of value, James has probed 
into more than he has developed as an inquiry into value. 
ii. Is James's treatment of the self adequate to his own 
demands and assumptions? 
The weaknesses inherent in James's method of intelligence 
~. 
exposed ambiguities in the will to believe. That focus reveals 
further difficulties in James's notion of the self. As ha 
been seen, James is trying to hold a burning candle. One end 
is lit with his loyalty to pluralism, the multiverse, and his 
emphasis on particulars. Here he stresses the variety and 
expansion of selfhood. Indeed, in his Gifford lectures, he 
even postulates a "~ubliminal self". But James lights the 
other end of the candle also. Here, James suggests that unity 
is an achievement founded upon intelligible direction in life. 
Unity and the self are "the most complicated fruit that are 
the rewards of conscious purpose and values. 
This latter principle of unity has left its mark in the 
history of psychology. Muller-Freientels and Dewey, two di-
verse thinkers, have both been influenced by James in this 
instance.l Both refer to organizational direction and achieved 
rather than inherent unity. This is not to minimize the de-
fect in James's doctrine. In the last analysis, James has not 
been able to reconcile the expansion ot self with the supposed 
unity of self. In James's Principles, though he insists that 
the Thinker is only a passing thought, he goes on to refer to 
a tsomething moren.2 In his briefer psychology James insists 
again upon 
the personal self rather than the thought Lwhic~ might 
be treated as the immediate datum of psychology. The 
universal fact is not 'feeling and thought exist' but 'I 
think' and 'I feel•.3 
---~~-~~-~-----~--~-1. See Muller-Freienfels, EMP, 277-278, and Dewey, HNC, 306. 
2. James, PP, I, 299. 
3. James, PBC, 153. 
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It is apparent that James does not reject the notion of 
personal identity, rather he doubts it. While James affirms 
II the self as a fighter for ends" and when he doubts the exis-
tence of the self he fails to consider and develop explicitly 
what for him is the major source of unity; namely, how vital 
energies cooperate and are directed purposefully within the 
whole organism. James fails to resolve the psychological prob-
lem of the one and the many. He fails to account for this 
cooperative process either with an explicit doctrine of self 
or with a principle of cooperation or direction. Such a prin-
ciple, according to his own assumptions, is necessary to ex-
plain the continuity and unity of behavior. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BASIS OF VALUE IN PERSONALITY ACCORDING TO JAMES. 
1. Purpose of the Chapter. 
The purpose of this chapter is to complete James's organic 
and synoptic treatment of the whole man. The previous chapter 
I 
stressed James's conceptions of experience, motivation, the 
self and perception. This chapter will reconsider these doc-
trines from the perspective of James's theory of value. More 
precisely, it will ascertain how James's value theory completes 
his conception of personality. While the major purpose is to 
examine James's unification of personality and value, no less 
important will be internal criticisms that derive from this 
unification. Related external criticisms that are derived 
from a more comprehensive view of personality and value will 
be suggested in the next chapter. The final chapter will con-
tain synopses of the meanings and criticisms of James~s doc-
trine, with a formulation of conclusions. 
The first task in this chapter is to indicate the continu-
um between personality and value according to James. This can 
be accomplished in two ways. The first is by an elaboration of 
what Perry and Dewey have suggested as the "organic basis of 
I value" in James's thought.1 The second will be by illustra-
ting this principle contextually; namely, by indicating the 
I meaning and role of value in conduct according to James. 
I --------------------I 1. See Perr~, SWJ, l2?ff~ and Dewey, PC, 25ff. 
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The second task of the chapter develops out of the need 
to emphasize James's value theory. In order to understand the 
role of value in conduct, it will be necessary to ascertain how 
James defines value, his criterion of value, as well as the 
types and degrees of value experience. 
As a result of following James's organic and synoptic de-
velopment of character, the discussion on value will eventuate 
in James's doctrine of character. Character for James is the 
interpenetration of habit, will, and value controlled by the 
method of intelligence. The third task of this chapter, then, 
is to examine this doctrine and to ascertain the relation of 
character to personality. ith the accomplishment of these 
three tasks, the first purpose of this thesis will be realized. 
2. The Continuity between Personality and Value. 
i. The Organic Basis of Value. 
As has been seen, James's break with traditionalism is 
most conspicuous in his view of the person. For James, man is 
a selective animal, not basically a rational animal in the 
traditional sense. The quality that makes life human lies 
not in speculative reason, but in ftthe exuberant excess of his 
subjective propensities".1 This principle of selection or 
value is the dominant motif in James's interpretation of per-
sonality. Value, then, is a natural process, organic to ex-
2 perience as a whole. In order to understand what James 
----------~---------1. Op. cit. 
2. Recall that for James mind is not a thing, but an activity. 
A major postulate in the Principles is that mind is relative to 
llthe pursuance of future ends" and the choice of means for 
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means by this organic basis, it is necessary to recall the 
ground he has laid for the continuum between personality and 
value. 
It will be remembered that for James, consciousness is 
I teleological. As a substance it has no existence. As a func-
tion or stream, mind exists in proportion to the intelligence 
and control manifest in pursuance of ends that ahow a choice 
of means.1 This also brings to mind the stress James places 
on active adjustment or accommodation as well as the dynamic 
and creative nature of perception. These doctrines are the 
roots {not to be confused with the fruits) of James's value 
theory. 
Valuation or preferential behavior is man's most compli-
cated accommodation to nature and other selves. As James says, 
rtideality in conduct is altogether a matter of adaptationn.2 
Value is not an isolated subject of speculation but a qualita-
tive process that permeates all experience. Unlike tradition-
al philosophers who divorced value from fact, and who focused 
upon the objects of value, James shows that facts themselves 
are contingent upon a personal value continuum. He is further-
more concerned with the whole process of valuation rather than 
with the objects of value alone. For James, values emerge 
initially out of nature's challenge to the person, but their 
whole context includes his selection of responses. As James 
~-------------------{continued) their attainment". See James, PP, I, 8. Value is 
thus the very essence of personality. 
1. James, PP, I, 11. See also James, ERE, 37ff. 
2. James, VRE, 365-366. 
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says: 
our moral and practical attitude, at any given time, is 
always a resultant of two sets of forces within us, im-
pulses pushing us one way and obstructions and inhibitions 
holding us back.~ 
Values and ideals are "begotten out of the drift of com-
mon life''• 2 They are neither isolated desires nor mystical 
communions. As will be seen, values for James are man's prac-
tical attempt to achieve meaning and significance to his life. 
James is trying to show that values and ideals are inte-
gral to the whole of experience. Challenge and response are 
the keynote of his theory. Unlike Perry who would describe 
values as any object of any interest, or hedonists who would 
identify it with pleasure, James asserts that: 
it is natyral and even usual in human nature to court the 
arduous Lbecaus~7 quite apart from the immediate pleasure 
which any sensible experience may give to us, our own mor-
al attitude in procuring or undergoing the experience 
brings with it a secondary satisfaction or distaste.3 
Another clue to the organic character of value lies in 
James's reference to nature and the natural. Nature for James 
is a unity of the physical and the ideal. It constitutes a 
"moral multiverse", while physical nature alone is "a harlot to 
whom we owe no allegiance 11 • The whole of nature for James is 
the "non-artificial ••• novelty and possibility forever leaking 
i .. 4 n • The physical order of nature is "only one portion of 
--------------------1. James, VRE, 256. 
2. Ibid.' 325. 
3. Ibid., 293. Italics those of the present writer. Notice 
that for James valuing is a process of undergoing, beginning 
with a challenge or felt need, and continuous with the percep-
tion of realizaion. 
4. Perry, TCWJ, I, 215-216. 
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total universe" while beyond the apparent "there stretches 
an unseen world of which we know nothing positive but in its 
relation to which the true significance of our present mundane 
life consists".1 Nature is thus a unity of the actual and the 
ideal. To say that values are natural is to say that "all we 
know of good and evil proceeds from nature". The function of 
value is to enhance this unity by structuring the actual to 
conform to the ideal, and by basing the ideal on actual needs. 
The creation of value demands ttthe sight of the struggle 
going on". Life becomes significant only with the acceptance 
of challenge and growth. Though often harmful, challenge is 
11 the element that gives to the wicked outer world all its moral 
style11 • 2 Darwin saw successful adjustment in physical growth; 
for James one of the highest values is spiritual growth. 
ii. The Role of Value in Personality. 
James conceived life and nature as full of valuable and 
beneficial things. The function of life is to interpenetrate 
llw ith nature in order to achieve as many of these valuable 
things and events as possible. The role of value in personal-
ity, then, is of the first order. Valuing enhances the wel-
fare of the person and contributes to his spiritual growth. 
Values for James are empirical and natural for two distinct 
I 
reasons. Values first of all arise out of human needs and 
!interests, and as such, they are experientially justified. 
~ ~~~~:~-~~~~~~-~:~~=~at~ in, are sustained and tested by 
Sec-
1. James, EFM, 20, from "Is Life Worth Living?". 
2. Ibid. '= 289, from "What Makes Life Significant?". 
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ll 
experience, or more precisely, by the method of intelligence in 
dealing with experience. 
The continuum between value and personality is further 
evident since 
neither moral relations nor the moral law can swing in 
vacuo. Their only habitat can be a mind which feels~hem 
and no world composed of merely physical facts can por-
sibly be a world to which ethical propositions apply. 
Values are thus dependent upon personality. Neither value 
nor personality for James is complete in itself. More specifi-
cally, values emerge from needs and interests, while the means-
' end continuum that characterizes mind presupposes and refers 
to value experience. 
The question of the origin of value is not the most impor-
tant to James. Yet it is necessary to emphasize that, for 
James, the significance of value experience is a concrete fact, 
independent of metaphysical interpretations. It is true that 
man has needs and tries to satisfy those needs irrespective of 
whether God exists or not. But it should also be emphasized 
that "when ••• we believe that a God is there and that he is one 
2 
of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out". From 
the psychological view alone, value-experience is significant, 
but from the religious point of view the significance becomes 
more inclusive. 
A third relation between value and personality has already 
been suggested. Value-experience is not introspection alone. 
--------------------1. James, EFM, 190, from "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life". 
2. Ibid., 212. 
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According to James, values are experiences that are undergone 
behaviorally.l Value begins with an assertion or judgment, but 
it must eventuate in concrete, personal conduct. 
Without a claim actually ma~ by some concrete person, 
there can be no obligation Lsimilar~7 there is no obli-
gation wherever there is no claim.2 
Value experience then begins with a de facto claim that 
carries a de Jura quality to realize that claim in conduct. 
Personal effort must ensue before value can be realized. Value 
is not a subject of contemplation but an episodic process ot 
, participation. It begins with the perception of need, then a 
claim takes place; that claim is then tested by the method of 
intelligence, and finally the claim is acted upon in order to 
realize the value. No value claim possesses de jure quality 
without activity, even though it has de facto authority. As 
James says: 
the solving word for the learned and the unlearned man 
alike lies in the last reaort3 in the dumb wil&ingnesses of their interior characters. 
For James, then, it is not only a question of "do I enjoy 
this object", but also "shall I seek to perpetuate it?". As 
James illustrates: 
to hate evil does not mean to indulge in brooding feeling 
against particular evils; that is, to be possessed by it. 
No, it is to avert the attention, till your chance comes, 
and then strike home.4 
--------------------1. Not to be confused with Watson's or Pavlov's behaviorism. 
For James behavior is a continuum between the psychological 
and the motor. 
2. James, EFM, 194, from "Moral Philosopher and Moral Life". 
3. Ibid., 215. 
4. Henry James, LWJ, II, 123. 
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The fourth relation between value and personality lies in 
the nature of creative experience. The person, according to 
James, does not find values, he creates them. As was seen in 
the previous chapter, reality for James is the "experience 
continuum" and experience "is what I agree to attend to". This 
doctrine leads James to formulate a conception of attention 
that is determined by the practical (emotional and volitional) 
1 I interests which invests objects and events with value. 
James says: 
As 
whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective 
worlds may appear2 endued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator's mind. 
An unfinished world and truth in the making have thus but 
one meaning for personality; namely, that the world is plastic 
enough to be changed by a moral intelligence, though rigid 
enough to make that attempt a personal risk. 
The continuity between personality and value according to 
James can be thus summarized: man is a selective or valuation- 1 
al animal that acts in accordance with its needs and interests. 
Value for James is an episode in the continuity of experience 
that (1) emerges out of needs, (2) in which a value-claim is 
made to satisfy those needs; (3) that claim is then tested by 
the method of intelligence, and finally, (4) that claim is j
1 
acted upon in concrete conduct to realize the value. As a 
contextual affair, value for James possesses de facto and 9£ 
jure qualities. Values are empirical and natural, making for 
-------------------~ 1. See James, PP, I, 450-455. 





spiritual growth. Value or value-potentiality is hence the 
basic nature of personality, or the whole man. 
3. James's Theory of Value. 
i. The Criterion of Value. 
James has never offered a specific definition of what he 
means by value. He has, however, clarified the role of value 
in personality and he has also been clear as to the criterion 
or test of value. Some interpreters, beginning with a mistak-
en notion as to the nature of the will to believe, have errone-
ously concluded James's sole test for value and truth alike to 
ll
be human needs. 1· Following the method of intended meaning, 
then, the first task is to ascertain precisely what James means 
by a test ot value. 
I 
The first clue comes fro~ James's treatment of fact and 
value. One might suspect, and rightly so, that since J mea 
denies the supposed cleavage between fact and value, that he 
will also deny distinct methods of inquiry into these subject 
matters. For James, fact and value are unified, and the method 
of intelligence serves to inquire into both areas. The study 
of value for James is an existential inquiry. The "moral phi-
losopher" has tor his subject matter "the ideals he finds 
2 
existing in the world•. In the same context James adds that 
value and personality are actually one continuous subject mat-
ter that can be inquired into by the experimental method. He 
says: 
---~----------~~~---1. See Turner, WJP, 18-19. 
2. James, EFU, 185, from "Moral Philosopher and MOral Life". 
67. 
and, 
E~hical science is just like physical scienc,, and in-
stead of being deducible all at once from abstract prin-
ciples, must simply bide its timr, and be ready to revise 
its conclusions from day to day, 
psychology must therefore take account not omly of the con 
ditions antecedent to mental states, but of their result-
ant consequences as we11.2 
According to James, then, the criterion of vAlue, as well 
as all value inquiry is to be determined in relation to all ex-
perience and in harmony with the experimental (or experiential) 
method of inquiry. 
Need or demand is a partial criterion of value for James. 
His statement tha~ "the essence of good is simply to satisfy de 
mand" is well known. 3 Critics like Turner have t8ken this 
statement to be an arbitrary designation by James of what con-
sti~utes a test of value. Turner has failed to see ~hat James 
really presents a two-fold test of value. The first is an ex~ 
elusive test that emphasizes personal needs, while[ the second 
is an inclusive test that emphasizes relations. 
James offers many statements to verify this h~pothesis. 
He poin~s directly to the inclusive standard when he says ~hat 
the whole criterion of value is that which "harmonizes so well 
with the entire drift of experience"·.4 In another
1 
passage this 
t.est is "the hypothesis which we now make" together with "the 
ac~s to which they prompt us".5 In another essay James refers 
i :--j;;;;;-EFM;-2o8; from "Moral Philosopher and Mbral Life". 
2. James, PP, I, 5. 
3. James, EFM, 201, from ••Moral Philosopher and Moral Life". 
4. James, EFM, 105, from "The Sentiment of Ration~lity". 
5. Ibid., 184, from "Moral Philosopher and Moral Life". 
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to the exclusive standard of demands, but adds that these 
demands must prevail at the least cost to the person.l This 
emphasis is most pronounced in James's Gifford Lectures. In 
that text the standard of value is "if it seems most or~aniz-
11 able, most fit to enter into complex relation, most apt to be a 
member of a more inclusive whole".2 
Value for James begins with a recognition of experiential 
needs, but the standard of value is more comprehensive than the 
need itself. In the following passage James suggests a three-
! fold criterion. He says: 
The character of inner happiness in thought hich stamps 
them as good, or else their consistency with our other 
opinions, and their serviceability for our needs.3 
j In the same context he rephrases this criterion as formulated 
by our 
own immediate feelings primarily; and secondarily on what 
we can ascertain of their experiential relations to oir 
moral needs and to the rest of what he holds as true. 
In summary, then, the test of value for James begins with 
1 exclusive needs and ends with inclusive truths. The criterion 
of value is the affirmation of a genuine experience and need, 
jand testing the consequences of that value as well as testing 
the coherence of that value with what is known as true. 
I _____ ::: __ :~~-~~~~==ive and Relative Nature of Value. 
1. James, EF~ 205, from "Moral Philosopher and Moral Life". 
2. Ibid., 210. Note the relationship between this principle 
of inclusiveness or organization to the organizational achieved 
unity of selfhood that was suggested in the last chapter. This 
seems to mean that for James, values integrate the self. 
3. James, VRE, 17. I 4. Ibid., 19. Also James, PP, II, 579. 
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Value for James begins with subjective desire. From an-
other perspective that desire is also objective because it in-
volves an interpenetration of the person and his environments. 
Just as James breaks down the opposition between fact and val-
ue, he also denies the ultimate dualism between subject and 
object. 1 Truth for James is a creative relationship between 
an experience and a fact which emphasizes the significance of 
the fact. In the sense that values are personal, they are also 
subjective. In the sense that valuing involves active conduct, 
it is objective. Values are thus subjective and objective in 
proportion to the kind and degree of participation by a person 
with other persona and nature. 
James's position on the relative nature of value can be 
clarified by distinguishing between the universal process of 
valuation and relative values as substantive states or objects. 
As substantives, values and ideals "are relative to the lives 
that entertain them". 2 Values are contingent upon individual 
needs, interests, means of satisfaction, the social and cul-
tural nexus, and according to their inclusive relations to 
other values. Valuation as a process and as a theory of in-
quiry is not relative in the customary sense of the word. As 
a part of truth, valuation is based upon a growing coherence; 
upon tentative hypotheses that suppose tta standard outside of 
the thinker to which he must conform~.3 As an experiential 
-~---~-~---~--------1. See the previous discussion on James's conception of the 
self as known. 
2. James, EFM, 304, from "What Makes Life Significant?". 
3. Ibid.t 191, from '~oral Philosopher and Moral Life~. 
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process valuation follows the same principle; namely, an accep-
tance of the most intelligible methods and standards. James's 
fondness for ttparticulars" forced him to shy away from anything 
that suggested finality and dogmatism. Yet when he says that 
"every good experience ought to be interpreted in practice",l 
and "vote as to bring about the very largest total universe of 
goodn,2 James points to the inclusiveness of value and the 
I whole of experience. If this is a relativistic view, then it 
cannot be identified with traditional relativism of sophistry. 
iii. Personality and Social Values. 
As is well known, the problem of evil influenced James to 
postulate the conception of a finite God.3 Less known is the 
influence this problem had in James's formulation of social val 
ues. Indeed, Perry interprets James's value theory as a mor-
al individualism" and sees James's social and political sen-
timents" as a lesser part of his doctrine. For Bixler, *James 
is consistently individualistic" in his theory of value.4 
Since these writers have apparently not examined James's value 
theory in relation to his personal1ty theory, such a perspec-
tive might reveal other emphases and intentions of James. The 
purpose of this section, then, is to ascertain the meaning of 
social values for James from the point of view of his theory of 
personality. 
1. Mattbiessen, JF, 210, quoted from James's journal, 1866. 
2. James, EFM, 209, from "Moral Philosopher and Moral Life • 
3. See Bixler, RPJ, 138. 
4. Ibid., 107. 
-------=----
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The first novel emphasis to be noted is that James himself 
I distinguishes between individualism and individuality. As has 
been seen, individuality for James refers to the necessary cri-
tical function of each personality. James can be said to have 
1 a philosophy of individuality for he says: 
according to that philosophy, the truth is too great for 
any one actual mind ••• to know the whole of it. The facts 
and worths of life need many cognizers to take them in ••• 
the practical consequences of such a philosophy is the 
well know~democratic respect for the sacredness ot indi-
viduality. 
The moral quality that James insists upon is not indivi-
dualism, or the intrinsic value of personal differences qua 
differences. He rather stresses the feeling ot the sacredness 
of each individual. More specifically, James suggests that 
respect for each personality is an intrinsic value. Each per-
son makes a genuine contribution to truth and every person is 
responsible to use his critical intelligence. Each must there-
fore respect the intelligence and sacredness of all. James 
adds that nto escape bellum omnium contra omnes it is neces-
sary "for all to agree upon ••• the abstract best ••• that M,! 
goods shoUld be realized".2 
James never postulated a ~spiritual communityn as did 
Royce or a "public" as did Dewey. James was insistent, how-
ever, upon social as well as individual values. Values, accord-
ing to James, begin with the challenge and critical response 
of each person, but values function in interaction with social 
or natural processes. A hasty reading of the Gifford Lectures 
---~~----~-~--~----~ 
ll. James, TTT, v. 2. Perry, TCWJ 263-265. 
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could lead to the impression that James stresses the absolute-
ly individual and mystical character of religious experience. 
1A more adequate impression is based upon the role of value in 
personality, as well as other relevant ideas of James. In a 
letter to Edward B. Van inkle, James asserts that the best 
way to serve God is to serve your fellow-men •1 In a letter to 
Thomas Ward he adds that "we long for sYmpathy, for a purely 
cersonal communication, first with the soul of the world, and 
then with the soul of our fellows".2 
The theme of "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings•, is 
that each person must overcome his provincialisms and learn to 
~ respect the beliefs and values of others. James's essay on 
"The Moral Equivalent of War•, has a distinctively social 
theme. James recognizes that social disorganization is wrought 
by frustration and aggression. His solution is to satisfy "the 
higher ranges of men's spiritual energy" by the introduction of 
social, productive values.3 A dominant theme in James's Gif-
ford Lectures is to discover whether there can be 
a level of emotion so unifyibg, so obliterative of differ-
ences between man and man, that even enmity may come to 
be an irrelevant circumstance and fail to inhibit the 
friendlier interests.4 
That James has not provided for explicit social and cul-
tural categories of 
defect, however, is 
value is a defect in his value theory. Tha~ 
an external criticism that will be discusse1 
1. Perry, TCWJ, I, 102. 
2. Henry James, LWJ, I, 130. 
3. James, EFM, 324, from "Moral Equivalent of ar". 
4. James, VRE, 278. 
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in the fourth chapter. This much may be concluded on the basis 
of intended meaning; namely, that diversity and particulars not 
withstanding in James's emphases, he does insist that the in-
dividual transcend his own purposes and values in recognition 
of more inclusive aims. The moral achievement for the indivi-
dual personality lies in the reconciliation of his aims with 
the aims of others, or in the achievement of a diversity that 
is harmonious with his social environment. 
4. The Interpenetration of Intelligence with Habit, Will, and 
Value: James's Doctrine of Character. 
1. The Meaning of Character to James. 
Like MCDougall and Dewey afterward, James integrated his 
individual theories of habit, will, value, and experiential 
testing into a comprehensive doctrine of character. James's 
character cannot be closely identified with the moral will of 
Kant for two reasons. One is that Kant made an absolute breach 
between fact and value, or the theoretical and practical rea-
son. James would admit of no such dualism. For him, "the com-
plexity of the moral life~ is in its very essence "the mysteri-
ousness of the way in which facts and ideals are interwoven".1 
The second reason is that for James the moral will is conduct 
controlled by the method of intelligence in the adjustment to 
life.2 For Kant, reason is the content, while for James intel-
ligence is a method of understanding and controlling experience 
James does not associate character with physique or 
-----~--------------1. James, VRE, 347. 
2. James, PP, I, 125. 
--- -- -----===== 
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temperament. For James character is the emergence of organized 
1 creative value experiences. Character, like the self, is an 
acquired direction, focusing upon "ideal and inward relations 
amongst the objects of thought".1 Character is the organiza-
tion or base that makes experience selective and preferential. 
As James says: 
a philosophy is the expression of a man's intimate char-
acter, and all the definitions of the universe are but the 
deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon 
it ••• just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole pus 
and seeing the whole drift of life, forced on one by one's 
total character and experience.2 
Character is the "smouldering emotional fires", "the ex-
panding centerR of the person.3 In a letter to Mrs. James, 
illiam James says: 
the best way to define a man's character would be to seek 
out the particular mental or moral attitude in which, 
when it came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and in-
tensely active and alive. At such moments there is a 
voice inside which speaks and says ·~ is the real me•.4 
ii. The Relation of Character to Personality. 
The foundation for this integrated doctrine of character 
begins with James's theory of habit and effort. James points 
to the relation between character and personality when he says: 
keep the faculty of effort alive in yourself by a little 
gratuitous exercise every day ••• be systematically ascetic 
or heroic in unnecessary points. Do every day or two 
something for no other reason than that you would rather 
not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh 
it may not find you unnerved and untrained to stand the 
test.5 
--------------------1. James, PP, II, 639. 
2. James, PU, 20-21. 
3. James, VRE, 349. 
4. Henry James, LWJ, I, 199. 
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========*=5==· = James, PP, I, 1~2~5~·====~==================================~~======== 
James simply means by this that active conditioning is the 
key to learning and that learning is the key to adjustment and 
accommodation. Effort can only be elicited by a genuine in-
volvement that has been prepared in advance. The will unaided 
is meaningless, just as intellect alone is only a "technical 
ter • Character, then, points to the whole man. The practice 
that James suggests is no mere ascetic denial of desire. It is 1 
rather the conscious planning to control habits by intelligence. 
It is not a matter of repressing the passions by a strong will. 
According to James, there is nothing intrinsically evil about 
instinct and desire, especially in the larger whole of the per-
son. Desire is only evil when it becomes so inclusive that 
its consequences alter the whole drift of conduct. Effort, 
~ben, is an intelligible device to control innate habit by the 
acquisition of inclusive habits.l 
Character thus becomes a systematic whole comprised of 
general tendencies to act in a particular way upon 'tall the 
principal emergencies of life".2 It is also the balance of 
human traits set by the intelligence. The whole man is, then, 
the person who achieves a harmony between his personality and 
his environment by the method of intelligence. That harmony 
may be the character for James, or it may be that the function 
I of character is to attain an equilibrium. 
In the following passage James indicates this equilibrium 
which elsewhere was described as a "fusion" of ideal 
-----------~--------1. James, PP, I, 125-127. 
2. Henry James, L\iJ, I, 130. 
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aspirations, pluck and will.l--:ffe says: 
Excess, in human faculties, means usually one-sidedness or 
want of balance; for it is hard to imagine an essential 
facUlty too strong, if only other faculties equally strong 
be there to cooperate with it in action. Strong affec-
tions need a strong will; strong active powers need a 
strong intellect; strong intellect needs strong sympathies 
to keep the balance steady. I~ the balance exists, no one 
faculty can possibly be too strong--we only get the strong 
er all-round character.2 
Character thus embraces the whole person and the whole of 
experience.3 It is the achievement of a moral harmony, "the 
firmness, stability, and equilibrium succeeding a period of 
t d t d · · t n 4 In Ka ti t it i s orm an s ress an 1ncons1s ency • n an erms, s 
the moral will guided in conduct by the method of intelligence.5 
!character is that part of the person that designates character-
istic modes of valuational self-environment participation. It 
is the "moral self'' whose environment is an "ideal world". 6 
--------------------1. James, EFM, 306, from "What Makes Life Significant?". 
2. James, VRE, 333. 
3. Ibid., 256. See also 16?. 
4. Ibid.' 172-173. See also 195. 
5. James, PP, II, 393. 
6. James, PP, I, 316. 
7. See James, EFM, 141, 215, and 306. 
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universe". 
With the examination of James's interpretation of value, 
the first purpose of this thesis has been realized. With a dis 
cussion of personality, value, and character, the meaning of 
the whole man to James has been formulated. The key to James's 
inquiry lay in the manifold and dynamic character of the experi 
ential process. This key refealed a double importance. It 
first of all aided in the clarification of what James means by 
feeling, and the role of feeling in personality. Secondly, 
this key provided the meaning of intelligence to James. For 
James, the whole man is a continuum of personality and value; 
that is to say, human experience is a sensible, organic whole 
of needs, interests, values, and purposes. James's doctrine of 
character provided a valfte-perspective to ascertain his inten-
ded meaning of personality. It integrates individual habits, 
needs, and values, while the method of intelligence controls 
them. From another perspective, character for James is the 
base of value that makes experience purposefully selective. 
Throughout, James has stressed the organic nature of experi-
ence, as well as its growth from exclusive ends to inclusive 
ends. Like the self, value strives for unity, coherence, and 
wholeness in experience. This, then, is the meaning of per-
sonality and value or the whole man. 
5. Internal Criticisms. 
i. Does James resolve the basic opposition he maintains 
between personality and social values? 
As was seen James is not advocating a philosophy of ~-=====~========~~~ ======~~~ 
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individualism at all. His main intent is to indicate that 
unity and coherence are fruits achieved by the recognition of 
the intrinsic value of each personality. According to James, 
it is possible to achieve social values when all persons agree 
1 
that all values should be realized. He says further that the 
individual should maintain but transcend his individual needs 
and interests for a more inclusive end. James structures the 
problem as one of reconciling individual purposes within a 
social environment, or in other words, as the achievement of a 
social diversity. The purpose of society is thus to organize 
"principles fit for all to agree upon•• or in other words to 
find "some innocent way out"; to offend no interest, group, 
class, or individual. This solution is not without several in-
ternal difficulties. 
If James poses this solution as a norm, then he deteats 
his own purpose in advocating the method of intelligence as 
well as his rule of inclusive ends. Is it conceivable( to 
take an example from James's times) to be loyal to the cause 
of the Filipinos, and yet give the United States government 
the satisfaction of its needs and desires? Obviously, both 
groups must be subordinated to a common standard that can de-
cide upon the relative merits of each. According to James's 
simplification, each and all could have their way with the 
adoption of an agreeable norm. James never makes this norm 
explicit nor is it conceivable how such a norm could satisfy a 
society of particulars where differences rather than 
--------------------1. Synopsized from Perry, TCWJ, II, 263-270. 
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] likenesses are supreme. James has not reconciled the strands 0 
exclusiveness (personal demand) and inclusiveness (social de-
mand). Though tolerance is a virtue, it is impossible to see 
how the method of intelligence could agree to justify oppressio 
and imperialism at the same time. Perhaps James's basic defect 
is that he has not conceived of the social whole as an active 
contributor of value, but merely as the arbitrator among indi-
vidual values. 
ii. Are "forced options" consistent with the emphasis on 
probabilism and the testing of ethical hypotheses? 
Some critics of James have maintained that there are 
really no existential "forced options" where the "passional 
nature" must decide in the absence of fact. According to this 
criticism, on James's own assumptions the possibilities of 
doubting and further inquiry must always remain open. These 
critics thus ask, why cannot the "judicious intellect" remain 
tentative and skeptical? 
This criticism contains a partial truth, but it is also 
not without a misunderstanding of James's meanings. James 
would answer this criticism simply by asserting that doubt 
itself is a behavioral consequence based upon the alternative 
or se1ection of an option. If thinking exists for the sake of 
doing, then the consequences of a belief are the source of a 
forced option. The empirical opposite of theism is not 
atheism but skepticism. James's point is simply that once the 
alternative of skepticism has been selected, it denies the 
of belief and the consequences that 
so. 
I 
~l ensue from that belief. James's argument is that if a forced 1 
option presents itself, then a person is justified in believing 
notwithstanding the lack of complete and disinterested evid-
ence. To believe is to act accordingly, and if a belief can 
lead to valuable consequences, then it is empirical and justi-
fiable. 
James's error is more an exaggeration than a serious de-
feet. James emphasizes, perhaps too much, that belief and 
faith can create their own verification. As was seen, this 
assumption leads to subjectivism and autism if unsupported by 
public experience and standards other than need and interest. 
It is true that James is merely trying to justify experiential 
beliefs that cannot be decided upon arbitrarily and dogmatic-
ally. As such, his theory is of merit and is consistent with 
continuous testing based upon needs and values. 
81. 
CHAPTER "N 
AN EVALUATION OF JAMES'S INTERPRETATION 
OF PERSONALITY AND VALUE 
1. Purposes of the Chapter. 
This thesis began with two central purposes, the purpose 
of ascertaining the meaning and the purpose of ascertaining the 
significance of James's view of the whole man. The first pur-
pose has already been accomplished in the previous chapters. 
By following a method of internal coherence, James's intended 
meaning of the whole man has been grasped as well as justifi-
able criticisms that follow from his own postulates, Intended 
meaning, implied meaning, and internal criticism were empha-
sized in those chapters. 
The second purpose, to be considered in this chapter, 
seeks to establish an external coherence of James's interpreta-
tion. By evaluating James with standards external to hia 
thought, internal understanding can be confirmed, thus making 
for a comprehensive and critical appreciation. There are two 
specific purposes to this chapter. The first is to test for 
the significance, or signification and importance of James's 
interpretation. The second purpose is to ascertain Justifiable 
external criticisms of James's notion of the whole man. 
The present chapter can thus be divided intp three main 
parts. The first part is a formulation of an evaluational per-
spective to apply to James's meaning. This will be done by 
the by othesis of significance and the construct of the modern 
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cl~ate of opinion. The second part will be an application of 
that perspective, involving the test of significance, and a 
comparison of James to the modern climate. This attempt sug-
gests two main processes, that of discovering signification 
and that of importance. The signification of James's treat-
ment of the whole man will be sought by ascertaining its re-
trospective relations. That is to say, two dominant philosoph-
ers who have revealed a s nsitivity to similar experiences and 
problems ill be examined. The importance of James's idea of 
the whole man will be ascertained by its prospective relations; 
by observing the endurance of that idea and its place in the 
modern mentality. With this collection of external evidence, 
the third and final part of the chapter, that of external cri-
ticism, will follow accordingly. 
2. The Perspective for Evaluation. 
i. The HYpothesis of Significance. 
A new responsibility emerges with the awareness that for 
James personality and value constitute the whole man. From n 
internal point of view, the essence of personality, according 
to James, is value-experience. Having achieved a responsible 
internal meaning, the next responsibility is to seek for an 
external evaluation of this meaning. More specifically, 
James's basic idea of the whole man must now be adjusted to a 
test of its external validity and value. 
The main hypothesis of this thesis was introduced in the 
first chapter, asserting that "the significance of an idea can 
83. 
be gauged proportionately to the validity and value of the 
designata referred to in continuous human experiencen. This 
hypothesis will now be examined in detail, while in the next 
section it will be applied to James's idea of the whole man. 
The term significance has a two-fold reference to fact 
and to value. Signification, as Dewey and Bentley observe, 
1 
refers to the process of indicating specific designata. In 
contrast to this emphasis on factual verification, Susanne 
Langer uses the term significance to refer to value qualities 
in objects of art.2 Both definitions are to be used in the 
present inquiry. Significance, for this inquiry, then, first 
involves a signification of data, and secondly, the importance 
~r value of those data. This usage can be illustrated and 
justified by an example directly relevant to James. 
In a famous but ambiguous passage, James tries to justify 
the experiential method of testing ethical hypotheses. He 
says: 
our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, de-
cide upon an option between propositions, whenever it is 
a genuine option that
3
cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds. 
This passage is not without real difficulty for the begin-
ner of James's philosophy. The advanced student is disturbed 
by the terms ~passional nature• and "intellectn, for has he not 
already observed that James rejects faculties in favor of an 
organic view of the person? Out of its context and intention, 
~---------~--~--~---1. See Dewey and Bentley, KK, l44ff. See also Dewey, LTI, 511. 
2 • See Langer, PNK, l68ff. 
s. James, EFM, 42, from DThe ill to Believe • 
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the statement is confusing, although it is possible to gain an 
emotive anderstanding of the experience in question. Such an 
understanding might intuit the meaning of this passage, but as 
has been seen, empathic understanding unaided by a critical 
perspective has often led to misinterpretation. 
The method of significance succeeds where emotive under-
standing fails. The validity and importance of this statement 
can be intelligibly ascertained. James's statement is valid if 
the designata in question are real (i.e., have behavioral con-
sequences). James's statement is important insofar as it has 
endured in the sensitivity to that kind of ethical behavior. 
This thesis proposes such a perspective under the names of 
meaning and significance or internal and external coherence. 
Earlier chapters stressed intended meaning, implied meaning, 
and internal criticism based upon James's own assumptions and 
postulates. The aim of this method was to achieve an empathic 
but critical understanding of what James tried to do, and how 
far he accomplished his purposes. 
Even with such an internal grasp of the subject matter, 
requirements of external relations, signification, evaluation, 
and external criticism remain to be satisfied. The second 
distinct method, then, is an outer coherence to substantiate 
and develop the inner coherence of meaning. This external 
method has three essential purposes. The first is to clarify 
the behavioral data or designata involved.l (In the case of 
~~---~~----~---~~---1. Behavioral data encompassing the entire psychomotor continu 
um.~== 
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the above example, such an inquiry would ask how real is the 
experience of testing ethical hypotheses?). The second purpose 
is to ascertain the importance of such an experience. The 
third purpose is to observe whether James's meaning is coherent 
with other descriptions of personality and value. 
A complete grasp of James's basic idea, then, involves a 
critical treatment of its meaning and significance. While 
meaning refers to a basic internal inderstanding, significance 
refers to an external understanding of the empirical designata 
and their importance. 
The test of significance considers retrospective and pro- I 
spective relations as a clue to the designata in question.1 If 
experience is primarily a social event, then other thinkers, 
before and after James should reveal a sensitivity to similar 
problems. In the following sections, some of these thinkers 
and movements of thought will be observed. The validity of 
James•s basic idea will be found in a sensitivity expressed by 
Edwards and Emerson especially. The value of James's idea of 
the whole man will be found in the movement of thought gener-
ally identified as the modern mentality. Oversimplified, the 
prevalence of his idea in common experiences will testify to 
its validity, while its endurance in the continuum of experi-
ence will testify to its value. 
-~--~---------------1. For a positiv-ist like Susanne Langer, who claims that "gen-
uine empiricism is above all a reflection on the validity of 
sense data''-, this test would be unscientific. See PNK, 10. 
For an experientialist, however, this test is merely an affir-
mation that experience (not sense-data) is objective and social 
and can be studied as such. 
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ii. The Construct of the Modern Climate of Opinion. 
(1) Purpose of the Construct. 
The purpose of this section is to indicate the distinctive 
standards by which the significance of James's interpretation 
can be discovered. These standards can be achieved by the de-
velopment of a construct based upon the dominant ideas of the 
present that characterize what is loosely called the "modern 
I mind". 
I. A construct, as Wendell Johnson defines the term, is ttsome-
thing or some event that the scientist simply assumes to exist" 
on the evidence of ttinferential data". A construct is a log-
ical assumption used to explain what cannot be observed direct-
ly on the basis of what can be observed. An appropriate exam-
ple follows from the present use of the term. 
Certain ideas, emphases, and themes can be observed as 
characterizing modern modes of thinking. The scientific method, 
for example, is observable as a predominately modern approach 
to problems. Such diverse conceptions as operationalism, war-
ranted assertability, and the hypothetical-deductive are equal-
ly recognizable as distinctively modern. These conceptions can 
be behaviorally observed as individual tools of the scientist 
and philosopher. 
What cannot be observed, however, but what is useful to 
assume for coherence, are the common bases and assumptions of 
these ideas. Whitehead has provided several clues in this di-
rection. He has broadly characterized the assumptions 




underlying these ideas as the '•mentali ty of an epochn that 
~springs from the view of the world".l Thus the mentality or 
climate of opinion can be inferred from the dominant ideas that 
!pattern its modes of thinking, and its approach to problems. 
Whitehead observed that the modern mentality or climate 
of opinion differs from the previous romantic and mechanistic 
climates that were founded upon the assumptions of seventeenth 
century thought. The modern climate is distinctive because 
it not only questioned those assumptions (the doctrines of 
substance and identity for example) but rejected them and in-
troduced new assumptions.2 The present notion of a modern cli-
mate of opinion is based upon this historical development. 
Though some of the assumptions and ideas of the modern 
mentality are not necessarily original with this climate, they 
can nonetheless be identified as integral and active in the 
present mentality. The conception of change, for example, has 
its historical antecedents in Heraclitus and Hegel. Yet it 
was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that this 
conception became significantly reinforced by the biological 
notion of evolution. Furthermore, the conception of evolution 
~Jas for Darwin only a theory supporting his hypothesis of nat-
ural selection. With the twentieth century, however, the con-
ception of evolution became a life-philosophy. In contrast to 
the ancient Greeks who speculated upon change, and in contrast 
to Hegel who saw no inconsistencies between beliefs in 
-~------------------1. 'Whitehead, SMW, ix. 




substance and process, evolution in the modern climate has be-
come a creed. Such a philosophy accepts and welcomes all 
changes, and tries to control the direction of change in favor 
: of human purpose.1 This characteristic appears to be uniquely 
modern. 
An attempt to examine all of the ideas and assumptions 
that constitute the modern climate is a project in itself which 
is as yet undone. 2 This thesis must restrict its examination 
to those ideas directly pertinent to James and personality 
theory. Though the physicist or theologian might find other 
relevant categories, the basic framework is common for all such 
I inquiries. The next task, then, is to examine several of the 
dominant ideas that are an expression of the modern climate of 
opinion. 
(2) Characteristics of the Modern Climate of Opinion. 
(i) From an historical point of view the first 
such characteristic is the rejection of absolute idealism apd 
materialistic mechanism. Generally speaking, while thinkers 
in the former movement committed the "fallacy of misplaced con-
creteness", the thinkers and movements associated with mechan-
ism committed the "fallacy of simple location". It should not 
be assumed that any system precluding these errors and 
--------------------1. See Simpson's Terry Lectures (1948), ME, 265-279, for a 
naturalistic ethics based upon this modern conception of pro-
cess. 
2. There are many treatments such as Randall's lbfi Making of 
the Modern Mind and Commager's The American Mind that consider 
contemporary ideas, but fail to distinguish them from distinc-
tively modern ideas. 
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movements is ipso facto in the modern climate. The only war-
rantable deduction is that any theory characterized as modern 
does reject both movements and avoids both errors. 
Though these two systems of thought differ, they share in 
common an acceptance of the Newtonian world-machine with all 
its assumptions of finality and closure. Unlike the Platonic 
philosophic perspective that was based upon a mathematical 
ideal, the Newtonian philosophies were patterned after the 
subject matter and authorityd physics. The modern climate, 
on the contrary, considers mathematics as a tool rather than 
an independent subject matter. Vhile the modern climate in-
corporates physical emphases, it is more related to the con-
tent and methods of biology. Both absolute idealism and mat-
erialistic mechanism were equally dependent upon rationalistic 
. i 1 1nqu ry. Both systems were deterministic, absolutistic, and 
monistic. For both, value-experience is minimal. As James 
says of absolute idealism: 
religious monism comes with these consoling words: 11All 
is needed and essential--even you with your sick soul 
and heart. All are one with God, and with God, all is 
well".2 
This first characteristic, though negative, contains im-
plications for the positive program that emerged as a modern 
climate. Rejecting absolutism, the moderns accepted a new 
kind of relativism. Rejecting dogma, they widened and improved 
-------------------1. It should be recalled that Spencer and Clifford, two dom-
inant mechanists of the late nineteenth century never per-
formed an experiment nor followed any disciplined empirical 
methods. 
2. James, PRA, 293-294. 
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upon the sciences. Rejecting an internal logic, modern think-
ers sought for a specific methodology that was both empirical 
and useful. Rejecting metaphysical monism, they substituted a 
' pluralism based upon a novel conception of individuality. Re-
jecting the notions of substance and eternality, they substi-
tuted conceptions of process and probability. And finally, re-
jecting a soul-psychology with all of its implications, the 
moderns provided new meanings to personality and its signifi-
cance. The construct of the modern climate of opinion is 
hence a valuable device to aid in the test for the significa-
tion and importance of James's idea of the whole man. 
(ii) As long as a belief in substance was ac-
ceptable, absolutism was a logical result. With a rejection 
of this conception, and with a new emphasis upon dynamics, a 
unique brand of relativism emerged. The relativism of the 
modern climate should not be confused with the philistinism 
attributed to the sophists. Modern relativism engenders truth, 
it does not deny it. Philipp Frank adds that "relativism has 
not the slightest thing to do with agnosticism or skepticismrt.l 
As is well known, the philosophical doctrine of relativism 
emerged out of the implications of modern physics, especially 
from the theories of Maxwell, Einstein, Planck, Heisenberg, and 
Frank. From Einstein came the theory that time and space are 
not absolutes, but merely relative to the observer. Percy 
Bridgman later added that they are relative to the "operations" 
involved. Max Planck's Quantum Theory indicated that only 
11. Frank, RRT, xv. 
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probabilities could be observed. This deflated mechanism, for 
as Planck observed, even scientific prediction entails a chance 
factor. 
It was Newton's belief, if not that of the epistemology 
derived from his "block universen, that "real. thingsn can be 
observed directly. This assumption underlies both mechanism 
and absolute idealism. Einstein's time-space continuum de-
feated this assumption with its postulate that only relations 
and not things-in-themselves are observed, nor do entities 
underlie what Dewey later called ''transactive relationships". 
These implications were quickly incorporated into modern 
philosophy. Bridgman advanced a relativistic method of in-
quiry with his system of operationalism. He asserted that "all 
our knowledge must unescapably be relative to the operations 
selected11 • 1 Philipp Frank made a special attempt to indicate 
that modern relativism in no way implies sophistry but that 
"relativism means the introduction of a richer language which 
allows us to meet adequately the requirements of an enriched 
experience".2 Simpson's evolutionary ethics is decidedly rel-
ativistic. He says: 
the best human ethical standard must be relative and par-
ticular to man and is to be sought rather in the new evo-
l.ution, pe8uliar to man, than in the old, universal to all 
organisms. 
Relativism in the modern climate is thus an outcome of the 
rejection of absolutism and the theories of relativity and 
1. Bridgman, LMP, 10. 
2. Frank, RRT, 18. 
3. Simpson ME, 310-311. 
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quantum mechanics. Truth, for this climate, is neither essence 
nor subjective desire, but is a continuous process of testing 
tentative, empirical hypotheses of relations and consequences.l 
(iii) A third dominant theme in the modern cli-
mate is the meaning and role of science. Science itself is 
jnot a contemporary innovation. Modern science, however, is to 
be distinguished from traditional science in at least three 
respects. First of all, modern science is more a method of 
inquiry and way of thinking rather than a rigid content. 
Greek science differed from art, philosophy, and religion only 
by its content, while the same rationalistic methods served 
for all inquiries. Secondly, modern science has different 
relations to philosophy and religion than did traditional sci-
ence. As Dampier says, modern ''philosophy can no longer stand 
on its own base; it is once more linked with other knowledge". 2 
I odern philosophy is derived from science and is contingent 
Jupon the same general methods of inquiry. Traditional climates 
of opinion deduced science from and then fitted science into 
preconceived, philosophical notions. Thirdly, modern science 
embraces the new areas of the social sciences that tradition-
ally were matters of speculation. Mathematics, once the fons 
et origio of philosophy, is now recognized as a useful tool to 
quantify experimental theory. The social sciences, like 
--------------------1. Whitehead also has interpreted this emphasis on 
and consequences for modern personality theory. He 
every self "knows the world as a system of material 
and thus sees itself as mirrored in other things". 
214. 







economics, political theory, group dynamics, clinical and so-
cial psychology are molar attempts to understand human behav-
ior. Modern scientists are no longer bullied by the tradition-
al notion that science can only deal with "facts" while "values" 
must be left to speculation. The social sciences represent 
explicit attempts to influence human behavior according to cri-
tical and intelligible value-beliefs.1 Modern science thus 
has a definite role and responsibility in contemporary human 
affairs. 
(iv) A fourth characteristic of the modern eli-
mate is the revised logic that may be called experimental in-
!guiry. Formal logic alone could not serve the needs of a sci-
1 
entific age where conceptions of probability, relativity, and 
inductive procedures are central. The philological relation-
ship among the terms empirical, experimental, experiential, and 
experience should be noted as a clue to the intentions of mod-
ern logical inquiry. Such a logic is first of all insistent 
lupon considering all areas of reflective behavior. It denies 
the traditional cleavage between fact and value and empirical 
nd formal. It affirms that how thought processes actual~ 
operate, how they ought to function, and the tools necessary 
or ideal function are inseparable problems. As Dewey says, 
odern logic is "empirically founded and experimentally ap-
lied11.2 Modern logic is well characterized as a "theory of 
~-------------------~ . See Erich Fromm's attempts in EFF and MFH to construct a 
npsychology of ethics". See also unpublished papers on value 
ef the Harvard University Department of Social Relations. 
~· Dewey, RP, 138. 
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inquiry", more indebted to Hegel than to Aristotle, and more to 
Dewey than the symbolic logicians. 
(v) A fifth central conception of the modern 
climate is personality and conduct. Indeed, Miss Heidbreder 
claims that among the new emphases in modern psychology were 
nstrong intimations that the affective life of man might be 
very important and ••• that attention to the motor side of human 
nature might be enlightening".! Modern conceptions of person-
ality and conduct are derived from the notions of process, re-
lations, logic, experience and particulars. The "motor side" 
of human nature refers to the new emphases upon conduct, from 
I its beginnings in needs and tensions to its resolutions in 
I goals and purposes. It is highly important to observe how the 
modern emphases differed from those of traditional climates. 
Notwithstanding the variety of definitions of personality 
among modern thinkers, there is general agreement that person-
ality comprises the whole continuum between needs and goals 
and means-ends relationships. No modern theorist would neg-
lect to mention the environments of which the organism is a 
part.2 While traditional idealism exaggerated the importance 
of the person to the neglect of environmental influences, mat-
erialistic mechanism assumed that the person is merely a part 
of the environment, thus neglecting the human factor. Modern 
theorists, on the other hand, can be characterized by their 
-~~-~-----~-----~---1. Heidbreder, SP, 106. See also 152ft. 
2. For Allport, "personality is not substantive, it is 
~"· See Allport, PPI, 47, for this contrast betwwen 




attempts to include the data of both influences. Kardiner, for 
example, has emphasized the holistic, the personal, and the 
social factors in his interpretation of personality. He be-
l lieves that "the classical psychologies failed because they 
approached too small a segment of experience; because they did 
not reconstruct the human personality".1 
Another distinction between traditional and modern con-
ceptions of personality lies in the conception of purpose. The 
psychology derived from Aristotelian perspectives assumed that 
within all organisms there are specific potentialities and 
latent purposes that mature in experience. The mechanists, 
among them Lamarck, Comte, Watson, and Pavlov rejected this 
assumption and went to the opposite extreme of a rigid, atom-
istic determinism. Modern theorists like Dewey, Tolman and 
Allport have reintroduced the conception of purpose as an ac-
quired learned datum in behavior. These three thinkers would 
agree that purpose is an achievement in personality useful for 
directing behavior toward the realization of value. 
(vi) The last characteristic of the modern eli- , 
mate to be considered follows in linear fashion from the pre-
vious characteristics mentioned. This discussion began with 
I negative traits and implications of modern physics. It grad-
ually developed a frame of reference inclusive of human behav-
ior. The last characteristic can be called the metaphysical 
significance of personality.2 
~~-~~----~--~-~-~-~ 1. Kardiner, PFS, 6. 
2. This suggestion of a dominant social sci-
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ence is suggeste~d=b~~Mu~~h~~~3=~~~========~~========~~~======~ 
Any thinker identified with the modern mentality has been 
concerned with the problem of reality, God, nature, history, 
life, and other metaphysical problems. It is true that there 
are some contemporary systems in vogue that are repudtedly an-
11 ti-metaphysical. As was shown, however, there is no necessary 
relation between contemporary thinkers and thinkers in the 
modern climate.1 
Within the modern climate thinkers have been directly con-
cerned with metaphysical theory. In the American tradition, 
Edwards, Royce, Emerson, James, Dewey, Whitehead, Wieman, Harts-
horne, and many others have tried to relate their conceptions 
of personality to a metaphysical process like nature, history, 
and God. Among the personality theorists who have groped for 
explanations beyond the facts of the behavioral datum are 
Scheler, Klages, Dilthey, Allport, Murphy, Spranger, and Stern. 
There are undoubtedly many in the modern climate who re-
ject notions of a personal God. With few exceptions all are 
nonetheless concerned to explain personality in terms larger 
than itself. For Dewey it is the ttreligious attitude" which 
2 is belief in "an unseen power controlling our destiny". For 
Whitehead, the worship of God "is an adventure of the spirit, 
a flight after the unattainable". 3 For Max Otto it is a 
i. F. H. Bradley is a good example of a recent thinker, whose 
philosophic perspective is anything but modern. According to 
his major theme in Appearance and Reality, (1893) the world of 
appearance, expressed by science in terms of time and space, is 
self-contradictory and therefore illusory. Bradley thus reduces 
reality to a timeless and spaceless Absolute. Bradley's per-
spective is, of course not modern, for it revives arguments 
and themes that hearken back to Parmenides, Plato, and Zeno. 
2. Dewey, CF, 23. 
3. Whitehead, SMW, 276. 
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nresponse to the awesome and mysterious in life and the world". 
And for iieman it is a ''-creative communication" that ttwidens 
and deepens the body of meaning that all men can share~.2 For 
Murphy personality includes the sense of unity with the Lcos-
moAJ •• the nature of his esthetic demands upon it, and his feel-
ings of loneliness or of consummation in his contemplation of 
ittt.a 
In summary, the modern climate of opinion can be charac-
terized as the modern mentality that began with the rejection 
of seventeenth century assumptions. These assumptions are 
most evident in absolute idealism and materialistic mechanism. 
The characteristics of the modern climate of opinion are (1) th 
rejection of absolute idealism and materialistic mechanism, (2) 
relativism, (3) the meaning and role of science, (4) experimen-
tal inquiry, (5) personality and conduct, and (6) the metaphy-
sical significance of personality. 
The positive characterists of the modern climate came from 
three distinct areas. The first was from the new physics, es-
pecially the theories of relativity, probability, predictio~ in 
determinacy, relations, and process. Modern interpretations of 
evolutionary theory provided the second direction. The third 
direction is less well-known, perhaps because it lacked the 
savoir faire and popularity associated with technical research. 
As will be seen in the next section, that direction came from 
the philosophical and religious protests of the nineteenth 
-~-~---~~~~---------1. otto, SML, 166. 




century, a movement of which James was no small part. 
3. The Test of Significance. 
i. Tests of Signification and Importance. 
The hypothesis arising out of the last section is that the ! 
religious and philosophical protests against absolutism contri-
buted to the formulation of a distinctively modern climate of 
opinion. Protests alone, however, suggest a mere revolt, where 
as a positive philosophic perspective emerged equally from the 
views of Edwards, Emerson, Royce, James and Dewey, as it did 
from modern physics and biology. James's basie idea of the 
whole man will be signified within this new tradition. F.rom 
a retrospective point of view, Edwards and Emerson especially 
ill testify to the concreteness and significance of James's 
view. From a prospective point of view the importance of 
James's idea will be ascertained as it has endured in this new 
tradition and as it contributes to the character of the modern 
mentality. 
As a wbole, the purpose of this chapter is to achieve an 
external coherence of James's idea of the whole man. The first 
specific method of accomplishing this goal has been to indicate 
the aforementioned protests and positive characteristics that 
formulated the modern climate. The signification and importanc 
of James's idea hence follow from their retrospective and pro-
spective relations to this climate. While the second specific 
method is that of recognizing the retrospective relations of 
James's idea, the third method lies in prospective relations. 
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This thesis will then have accomplished the first phase of ex-
ternal criticism. James has already been examined directly. 
The present task is to examine James indirectly, through an 
aspect of the modern climate that was designed by Edwards and 
Emerson and that was constructed by Dewey and the new psycholo-
gy. 
ii. Retrospective Relations. 
(1) Similarities among Edwards, Emerson and James. 
The similarities among Edwards, Emerson and James 
strongly suggest the making of this new tradition of the whole 
man in which value is central, though Buckham seems to believe 
that James "is remote from Emerson as Emerson from Edwards".l 
Like James, Emerson and Edwards were writers immersed in the 
problems of their society and culture. The philosophy of all 
three emerged out of need and conflict rather than from a agen-
teel tradition". All were acutely sensitized to the problems 
and urgencies of their day, and all three met the challenge 
/directly. All were in common rebels against formalism and tra-
ditionalism. All three had insights into psychology and value 
theory that were far ahead of their time. In Emerson's idiom, 
Jall three were the "antennae of their civilization". These 
characteristics alone make for their importance in the continu-
ity of human experience. 
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All three wrote in a provocative, literary style, and all 
three used the essay form. All had loyal devotees and follow-
~rs, but none est~blished a system or founded a school of 
1. Buckham, Art.(l942), 130. ======~== 
II thought. All were equally misinterpreted. Edwards was 
attacked by the "liberals" of his day as an irrational Calvin-
ist. Emerson was perceived as a frustrated philosopher who had 
taken to aphorisms. James also was accused of irrationalism 
and romanticism. In some quarters his basic ideas were reduced 
to "a confused remnant of idealism, and not serious".1 
All three writers thus demand a comprehensive criticism, 
beginning with intended meaning. As Perry Miller has suggested 
of Edwards, an understanding of their meaning is more important 
than the position they fall into logically or historically.2 
This common misinterpretation may be due to the fact that all 
three were highly original, delighted with their experiments 
with ideas, but reluctant to submit them to the discipline of 
discursive language and logic. 
Notwithstanding their separate faiths and philosophies, 
all three were concerned with the practical aspects or conse-
quences of religious belief. For all three, speculative justi-
fications about religion were a secondary affair. Religious 
values for previous climates might well be characterized by 
the Aristotelian summum bonum of contemplation, Spinoza•s "in-
tellectual love of God", Hegel's contemplation of the Absolute, 
!Santayana's fondness for the poetry of religious belief, and 
even Royce's emphasis upon a spiritual rather than a behavioral 
community. For this new tradition, however, religion like 
psychology becomes participative.3 Religion now becomes a 
1. Santayana, BHO, 14. 
2. iller, JE, 25. 
3. For a similar trend in psychology (away from speculation 
and toward participation) see Allport, Art. (1945). 
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matter of converting drunkards, of raising funds for summer 
camps, of concrete charity, of education, of friendship and of 
other specific services to one's God and fellow-man. 
All three exalted experience over reason, and were equally 
vehement in their attacks upon intellectualism, though Edwards 
was the most abstract. "The only difference is in experiencett 
are words of Edwards, but they might have been said by Emerson 
or James. All three were enthused over their discovery of the 
experiential process. All accepted perception as reality, and 
dethroned abstractionism. All three were enlisted in the plu-
ralistic cause. All fought in their respective ways against 
the block universe of Newtonian philosophy. Though Edwards 
was most influenced of the three by Newton, he still rejected 
the atomism and closure of monism. Edwards was also influenced 
most by Locke. Yet all three denied the tenets of sensation-
alism in favor of a personal creative experience. What James 
said of Emerson's ltrevelation", might equally be said of Ed-
wards, that 
the point of any pen can be an epitome of reality; the 
commonest person's act, if genuinely actuated, can lay 
hold on eternity. This vision is the head-spring of all 
his outpourings ••• his life was one long conversation with 
the invisible divine1 expressing itself through individu-als and particulars. 
(2) Jonathan Edwards's Plea for an Experiential Reli 
gion. 
An apparent contrast between Edwards and James should 
be made. James, it will be remembered, e~oyed acceptance and 





popularity in his own lifetime. If the United States, like 
Europe, has had an "age of genius't, then James was certainly 
among those geniuses and was respected by them.1 Edwards's ca-
reer v1as less satisfying and certainly an unhappy one. He was 
seldom appreciated in his lifetime. Edwards's cultural pattern, 
unlike that of James, was strained with religious and intellec-
tual intolerance. Though James's Gifford Lectures focused 
upon the abnormal and unusual, his underlying ideas were per-
ceived and welcomed in many quarters. Edwards, on the contrary, 
had to resign from his Northampton congregation after publici-
zing his attempt to establish an empirical justification for 
religious belief. 
I "A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections" has much in 
common with James's Gifford Lectures, notwithstanding their 
time-span of one hundred and fifty-six years. Bixler evaluates 
both studies as experimental attempts to deal with the probabi-
lities rather than certainties of religious belief.2 James 
himself interprets Edwards's treatise as 
an elaborate working out of this thesis. The roots of a 
man's virtue are inaccessible to us. No appearances what-
ever are infallible proofs of grace. Our practice is our 
only sure evidence.3 
Both writers also inquire into valuation processes as a 
--------------------1. If the testimony of Perry, TC~J, I, 319-362 and II, 76-81 
is reliable, then there appear on the American scene only two 
figures who were inhospitable and even hostile to James's 
theories. They were James's rival, Titchener, who imported 
fundtian psychology from Leipzig, and Santayana, whose ttgen-
teel tradition" James held in contempt. 
2. Bixler, RPJ, 217. 
3. James, VRE, 21. See also 112, 196, 243 and 323 for other 
references to Edwards. 
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whole. Both consider religious experience as a widening and 
maturation of other values rather than as a distinct and un-
related affair. Perry Miller has called Edwards's treatise 
"the most profound exploration of the religious psychology in 
all Americau.l If this judgement has any validity, then it 
follows that Edwards's emphases and major themes can be helpful 
in ascertaining the signification and importance of James's 
theory of the whole man. If experience is a social and objec-
tive affair, then each writer should testify to the validity 
and importance of the other. · This assumption follows from the 
postulate of the continuity of human experience. 
Edwards's major theme in his treatise is the personal and 
creative nature of experience. From this basic conception, 
Edwards proceeds to observe how fruitful experience is for the 
I
I development of value and for the belief in God. For Edwards, 
if the "religious problem" exists at all, then it exists in a 
particular "moral consciousness". Church, covenant, and ritual 
1 
I 
are only custom, and cannot be confused with the "consciousness 
of God".2 While Edwards characterizes religious experience as 
an "inclination" to will the inherent good, for James it is an 
nattitude", "whatever it might be, toward what he felt to be a 
primal truth".3 Like Emerson and James, Edwards affirms nr 
am my own cause". For Edwards, ••true religion consists in 





Miller, JE, 177. 
Ibid., 56. 
James, VRE, 35. 
Miller, JE=' 194. 
)I 
I 
"union with something larger than ourselvesn.1 Aa has been 
seen, James believes that all experience is value-directed. 
For Edwards, experience is "moral" since it contains the "in-
herent good" and strives for the "objective good". The ttmoral 
order" is neither essence nor idea, but ttthat fitness of rela-
tionships11 which depends upon the fashion in which an object 
affects the perceiver" •2 For both philosophers, values are th 
relative to life's demands and goals. 
Almost two hundred years after Edwards's publications and 
a hundred years after Emerson, the newer psychology made much 
out of the interrelationship between perception and motivation. 
Modern psychology emphasizes the structural and functional de- 11 
terminants of perception. Edwards, like Emerson and James, per-
haps in intuitive fashion, anticipated such emphases. Reject-
ing Locke's notion of atomistic perception, Edwards believed 
that perception "carries in the very nature of it the sense of 
the heart".3 Perception, motivation, and value are organical-
ly related. "As a man perceives, so is he predestined to be ••• 
as a man inclines, he wills."4 Inclination, which for all 
three writers is the foundation of character, is that which 
directs activity through personal, selective, and creative val-
ue-experiences. This idea has endured within the modern climate 
and as such, manifests the importance of Edwards's and James's II 
thinking on personality and value. 
--------------------1. James, VRE, 515. 
2. Miller, JE, 152. 
3 • Ibid. , 184. 
4. Ibid., 65. 
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(3) Emerson's Idea of the Whole Man. 
I 
Edwards's and James's emphasis upon individual value-exper-
ience is equally predominant in Emerson's reference to the 
ttmoral sentiment" .1 Indeed, these writers justify a belief 
in individuality on the facts that each individual must adopt 
lhis own base of value and must act with intelligence. 
son says in "History": 
As Emer-
a man is a bundle of relations, a knot of roots, whose 
flower and fruitage is the world. His faculties refer to 
natures out of him, and predict the world he is to inha-
bit, as the fins of the fish foreshadow that water exists.2 
Man's life is the life of value, "a progress and not a 
station". "Not in Nature but in man is all the beauty and 
worth he sees."3 Nature is a process, "fluid and volatile", 
II that man enlists in the creation of value. It is the "vehicle 
of thought", and without personality nature is mere brutish-
ness.4 The whole man, then, is the selection and realization 
of value in the continuous interaction between personality and 
nature. 
bile value is the keynote to the whole man, the experi-
ential attitude is also central. Emerson insists that "no 
j facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, 
an endless seeker, with no past at my back11 • 5 For Emerson, 
this attitude arises out of the "creative impulse" of the 
--------------------1. Note the similarity among Edwards's use of the term "affec-
tion" with Emerson's term "moral sentiment" and James's doc-
trine of feeling and the "sentiment of rationality". 
2. Emerson, Works, 13. 
3. Ibid., 53. 
4. Ibid., 847. 
I 5 e Ibid., 113. 
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"progressive soul" that "in every act attempts the creation of 
a new and fairer whole". 1 Circles are Emerson's figurative 
term for expressing the Gestalten that lead to richer value-
experiences. They are not unlike the relations James refers to 
as nobtaining between thoughts and something else ••• contextual 
things". 2 
Often quoted is Emerson's aphorism that ''man is religious 
because he is moral, not moral because he is religious". This 
statement affirms the emphases that have come from Edwards and 
James; namely, that man is basically an evaluational being, 
while religion is one of the fruits of his nature. Religious 
error, for Emerson, "consisted in making the symbol too stark 
and solid, and at last, nothing but an excess of the organ o 
language••. 3 This internal criticism of organized religion 
!echoes from Edwards's condemnation of "speculative understand-
ing" and rings of James's attack upon traditional theology. 
Because value is present in all experience, Emerson main-
tains that "every fact is related on the one side to sensation, 
and on the other, to morals".4 The scientific or experiential 
mind for Emerson is the whole man who has faith in a "moral sci 
ence n, or in the method of intelligence. As Emerson says: ''the 
lought, that Deity, is one thing with Science, with Beauty, and 
with Joy."5 Since all experience is value-directed, then a 
1. Emerson, orks, 461. 
2. James, ERE, 134. 
3. Emerson, Works, 144. 
4. Ibid., 709. 
5 • Ibid. , 873 • 
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JJ basic principle of intelligence must apply to all of its 
phases. 
it is interesting from the perspective of signification 
and importance, to note the respective meanings of science 
to these three thinkers. Edwards, though influenced by Newton 
and Locke, believed that science as an attitude in dealing 
with experience rather than with sensations or atoms.1 Emer-
son saw all of science built upon the interpenetration of man 
and nature. James, has been seen to have been born into anoth-
er culture and Zeitgeist. He rejected the scientific methods 
and assumptions of his day, especially as they were imposed 
upon the new psychology. Indeed, as Flugel has observed in 
his contrast between Titchener and James, Titchener was more 
interested in making the new science of psychology conform to 
a priori scientific methods, whereas James tried to adjust the 
scientific method to fit the demands for a study of the whole 
man. 2 
Retrospective relations of James have thus aided in the 
tasks of signifying and evaluating his doctrine of the whole 
man. The specific aids have been three central ideas held in 
common by Edwards and Emerson; namely, that man is a whole be-
ing, his basic nature is valuational, and that the method of 
experiential testing of possible values is the sole method of 
intelligence. 
·iii. Prospective Relations. 
--------------------1. See Miller, JE, 45-55, 122-123. 
2. See Flugel, HYP, 229-232. 
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(1) John Dewey's interpretation of personality. 
The validity and importance of James's theory of the 
whole man have thus far been located in their retrospective 
relations. It is reasonable to assume that the emphases in 
Edwards and Emerson on the whole man, on the nature of value-
experience, and their search for an intelligible method of in-
quiry substantiate similar emphases in James. The validity and 
importance of James's view will now be ascertained according 
to its prospective relations, by observing how that basic idea 1 
and its assumptions have endured in continuous human experi-
ence. Those relations include two dominant and related empha-
ses, the interpretations of personality furthered by John Dewey 
and by the new psychology, both of which occupy a distinctive 
position in the modern climate of opinion. 
For James and Dewey alike, the starting point of person-
ality theory is the personal, directed activity of the organism 
I that has needs and problems to be solved. Both incline toward 
a psychomotor interpretation since they insist that the entire 
I "serial" continuum between needs and goals, or means and ends 
must be considered as a molar unit. For both writers, think-
11 ing is intentional and purposeful. It is primarily a mode of 
adjustment that culminates in activity. Dewey, more explicitly 
than James, advances a conception of intelligible behavior 
I that is a "directed tendency to change the precarious and prob- 1 
lematic into the secure and resolved".1 Personality theory for I 
~~-~~---------------1. Dewey, QC, 225. 
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j both writers is inclusive of needs, purposes, values, goals 
and the means available to achieve those goals. 
Just as James posits the self as a "fighter for ends", 
Dewey conceives of the self as a doer that sets up purposes, 
1 
plans, to realize ends". Both writers reject associationism, 
structuralism, formalism, and the "spectator" theory of know-
ledge. Perception, like intelligence, is considered by James 
and Dewey as an adjustive mode of response relative to one's 
character, needs, and values. While Dewey emphasizes the "prac 
tical character of reality", James stresses ttideal and inward" 
relations that add to objective events and processes. Both 
thinkers agree that experience is primarily a selective, or 
j value-directed affair. Both affirm that the subject and objec~ 
form an experiential whole, neither of which can be studied 
j independently. 
I 
Dewey accepts James's basic conception of habit but *ries 
to make the doctrine more flexible and plastic. Dewey defines 
habit as an "acquired predisposition to ways or modes of re-
sponse, not to particular acts". 2 Like James and McDougall, 
Dewey ascribes to habit a motivational property and thus devel-
3 
ops a more synoptic doctrine of character. Both James and 
Dewey recognize habits as central to personality. Dewey says 
that if a person can "acquire one good habit; an intelligible 
and valuable mode of response, then his whole self is affected 
I ... -.. ---------------~--1. Dewey, Art.(l939). 
2. Dewey, HNC, 42. 
3. Ibid., 89-172. 
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for the good".l Both writers develop this conception of char-
acter from the basic interpenetration of habit, will, value, 
and intelligence. The keynote to Dewey's theory of character 
is the consecutiveness and consistency among habits as formu-
1 lated by intelligible selection. Both writers also advance a 
conception of freedom based upon the control of behavior to 
realize ends. Both conceive of motives as constantly changing, 
goal-directed activities. Dewey, specifically relates these 
activities to the "reconstructive agency" of intelligence, 
while in James the will to believe rather than a broad method 
is central. Neither writer defines personality, 2 but both are 
concerned with the true meaning of human conduct. From that 
basic meaning both derive their important conceptions of char-
acter. 
The major difference between James and Dewey is a differ-
ence between an individual and a social psychology. For James 
the whole man is a personal continuum of value-experience, 
while for Dewey, the whole man embraces social structure. 
James consistently advocated a psychology of individuality, 
while for Dewey, "private consciousness is an incidental out-
come of experience".3 Allport has interpreted Dewey's purpose 
to develop a science of the complete man, the sort of man 
who will ementually be capable of living prod~ctively in 
a full-fledged democracy of his own creating. 
1. See Dewey, HNC, 280 and James, TTT, 66. 
2. In effect, both James and Dewey would agree, however, that 
personality is that goal-directed activity that can realize val 
ues. 
3. Dewey, CI, 11. 
4. Allport, Art.(l949). 
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As Allport has shown, Dewey's personality theory is sup-
ported by explicit social aims and values for a democracy. I For , 
James, on the other hand, the primary datum of personality is 
the inherently private being and his behavioral involvements. 
For Dewey, the primary datum is the transactive event that oc-
curs among social organisms.1 While James emphasizes the per-
son as a continuum among needs, values, and activity, Dewey 
stresses the ttconnections and interactions" in public experi-
ence. 
Systematically, James and Dewey have many differences in 
personality theory. According to a perspective of the whole 
man, however, Dewey is seen to complement rather than contra-
dict James. He brings out more explicitly the importance of 
valuation~l behavior, the method of critical intelligence, and 
the full significance of the experience-continuum. 
(2) Personality Theory in the Modern Climate of 
Opinion. 
The modern mentality in personality theory has been 
condensed for discussion purposes into John Dewey's interpreta-
tion of personality and the new psychology whose goal is to 
achieve a science of the whole man. Both Dewey and this cli-
mate are viewed as the prospective relations to James and in-
sofar as James has contributed to these thinkers and emphases, 
so far is his doctrine important. The purpose of this section, 
then, is to indicate five ideas central to modern personality 
theory. 
1. See Dewey and Bentley, KK-'= 117. 
11~. 
This chapter has indicated that the modern climate of 
opinion began with the rejection of absolute idealism and mat-
erialistic mechanism. The psychology of both systems was atom-
istic and elemental. While a mechanist like Spencer reduced 
personality to genetic and voluntaristic forces, a scholastic 
psychology emphasizes 1'cogni tiontt to the expense of the whole 
person. Kurt Goldstein has observed the underlying "analytic 
lmethodu of these traditional approaches that displace experi-
ence in favor of instincts, states, faculties, and forms. He 
has further characterized modern psychology by its "holistic 
!!Dproachu.1 Young has further shown that a modern motivational 
theory cannot enumerate absolute motives and then casually re-
late them to atomistic needs and goals.2 Murphy characterizes 
jmodern psychology as an "attempt to study the whole man .a 
!
1 
A second dominant idea in modern personality theory is 
p§ychological and cultural relativism. This idea came in one 
direction from the implications of physical relativity. In 
another direction it came from the life-philosophies based upon 
evolution. Edwards, Emerson, and James were great contributors 
to this latter direction. It was natural for the traditional 
1 personality theorist to search for a substratum self or soul 
underlying experience. This seems to follow from the 
------------------~~ 1. Goldstein, HNLP, 3-15. See also Koffka, PGP, 25ff. It 
seems reasonable that the modern climate of opinion, which is 
I 
more inclusive than the new psychology, can also be character-
ized as holistic. Note especially the concern for relations 
evidenced in the writings of Whitehead, Dewey, Alexander, ead, 
and others. 
2. Young, MOB, 530-535. 




assumptions of substance and causality. With the rejection of 
II these beliefs from psychology, it was no longer necessary to 
struggle with this age-old problem. Indeed, as Murphy has 
shown, modern theorists are concerned with the relativity of 
the self concept" rather than the oversimplified problem of 
identity.l The new disciplines of social psychology and cultu 
al anthropology offer convincing evidence that the self-con-
cept is relative to the culture, to the social structure, to 
the group, and to individual factors.2 
A third central idea derives from the wider philosophical 
notions of process, change, and evolution, and may be called 
1 functional purposivism. For Aristotle, whose assumptions dom-
inated psychology until the end of the nineteenth century, per-
sonality as an organism contains inherent purpose or entelechy. 
Experience is hence the mere appearance or actualizations of 
essence and potentiality. Such a theory is no less determin-
istic than is that of materialistic mechanism. Modern theo-
rists like Allport, urphy, Murray, Angyl, Koffka and Rogers 
have rejected these assumptions in favor of acquired purposes 
and learned motives. Rogers conceives of "ego-integrative 
forces that are self-directional , while Angyl posits a 
trend toward homonomy and Goldstein a ~tendency toward self-
actualization •3 
A fourth major idea in modern personality theory is an 
-~~~~~--------~-----1. Murphy, PER, 921. 
2. See especially Kardiner, PFS, 365, 372-374. 
3. See Rogers, Art.(l946), Angyl, FSP, 172-174 and Goldstein, 






upon the relatedness of fact and value,1 has shown that psycho-
ll logy cannot be divorced from the cultural pattern and the value 
systems in which it functions. Erich Fromm has thus tried to 
combine psychology and ethics, while the experiments of Lewin 
11 have decided implications for a democratic community.2 
(3) Jamests Contributions to the Modern Climate of 
Opinion. 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate James's idea of 
the whole man as it has contributed to modern personality 
theory,3 and how several of James's emphases have become out-
dated. Those ideas of James that have had consequences not 
only for other theorists but also for experience as a whole, 
will be observed as important. Those lesser ideas and concep-
tions, perhaps unessential to James's interpretation of the 
whole man, will be observed to have historical significance 
alone. The next section will consider those aspects of James's 
view that have not endured in the modern climate. This thesis 
will then have accomplished its second objective, of evaluating 
the validity and importance of James's interpretation. 
The major contribution of James to the modern climate in 
psychology has been the ideal of studying the whole man. 
~ l~--5;;-Aii;~;t~-A;t.(l946) for a discussion of this emphasis. 
2. See especially Lewin, Art.(l939), where in collaboration 
with Lippitt and White has experimentally demonstrated the ef-
fective value of democratic relationships as contrasted with 
authoritarian and laissez-faire relationships. 
3. For a comparison of these evaluations with other investiga-
tions, see Wiener's summary on the "philosophical legacy of the 
founders of pragmatism" in EFP, 190-206 
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Ewer has declared that James's "general idea of the nature and 
air of psychology has determined in no small degree the course 
of contemporary thought" .1 James • s basic psychomotor approach 
to personality has been inclusive of needs, values, perceptions, 
motives and goals, as well as the means-end continuum. For the 
I' 
modern psychologist like Goldstein, this has affirmed the 
holistic or molar approach to a study of the whole person. In 
this respect, the modern climate in personality theory has been 
influenced more by James than by Dewey. James's ideal of 
searching for the whole man is essentially an individual psycho-
logy that has found more acceptance than has Dewey's conception 
of the whole man that emphasizes public experience rather than 
uniqueness. Allport for example, has incorporated James's idea 
of the whole man into his system of psychology. He says: 
To study Lffiaril most fully is to take him as an individual. 
He is more than a bundle of habits; more than a nexus of 
abstract dimensions; more too than a representative of 
his species. He is more than a citizen of the state, and 
more than a mere incident in the ~igantic movements of 
mankind. He transcends them all. 
James's second contribution, that of experiential continu-
ity, is derived from the basic notion of the whole man. 
James's investigation of the experiential process and his dis-
covery of transitive relationships has been most fruitful for 
psychological research. It is true that there has been no 
psychologist who has followed James with a specific doctrine 
of feeling. Equally true, however, is that James's insights 
into the "specious present", his construction of conceptions 
--------------------1. Ewer, Art.(l942). 
2J Alloort, PPI, 566. 
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based upon transitive relations rather than substantive states, 
and his notion that intellect is but a specialized part of ex-
perience, have provided a new framework for understanding ex-
perience. Prior to James many psychologies were based upon 
the association of simple ideas, upon sensation, or upon some 
voluntaristic process. After James, however, every major the-
orist began his inquiry into personality on the basis of exper-
ience and purposeful behavior, rather than upon the tradition-
al abstractions of sensations and the compounding of mental 
states. 
The third contribution follows from James's notion of ex-
perience and conduct. It is the value is the keynote to per-
sonality and basic to all experience. The whole tradition be-
hind James, McDougall, Spranger, Allport and Dewey has been 
that values emerge from needs and interests and that valuation 
is the determinate of the person. Spranger and Fromm have con-
ceived of valuational types or characters, that act in accord-
ance with their own achieved base of value. James's doctrine 
of value has shown that experience is not merely adjustment to 
nature, but also that the person can accommodate nature to his 
values and purposes. The primacy of value in human conduct is, 
then, a distinctive contribution of James that has influenced 
the direction of modern personality theory. 
The fourth major idea of James that has worked its way 
into modern theory has been the role of intelligence in person-
§lity. When James inquired into the nature of mind, he reject-
ed the substantive notion that mind is substantive or that it 
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could be localized. Mind is not a "lumpn, but a relative and 
continuous process of searching for means to realize expected 
ends. Intelligence is thus not the content of "cognition", 
but the method in experience whereby means and ends are select-
ed according to values and principles. For James then, intel-
ligence itself is a moral process in the pursuit of ethical 
ends by ethical means. 
fifth contribution of James to the modern climate of per 
sonality theory has been his conception of the social self. 
From a metaphysical point of view it is questionable whether 
James's account of the self is satisfactory. From the perspec-
tive of personality theory however, there is no doubt that 
James's notion of the social self pioneered into the new ter-
ritory of social role and role behavior as suggested by Cooley, 
Mead, Dewey, and Newcomb. James's statement that the self is 
J the "most complicated fruit" of personality is based upon his 
perception of social groups in accord with the emphases of 
Cooley and Mead upon role-taking and role behavior.l His be-
lief that *'whilst the innermost of the empirical selves of a 
man is a Self of the social sort, it yet can find its only ade-
quate Socius in an ideal world•', 2 has been affirmed by Dewey 
who says that it is the self that identifies and unifies the 
actual and the ideal.3 
The final idea to be discussed in this section is James's 
contribution to modern thinking on the metaphysical 
--------------------1. See Mead, MSS, 173~ 204. 
2. James, PP, I, 316. 
3. Dewey, AE, 277. 
llQ 
significance of personality. As was seen, the modern climate 
as a whole has been concerned with the problem of the relations 
of the individual to reality. James himself has been vitally 
concerned with the "personal communication" of personality 
"first with the soul of the world and then with the soul of our 
fellows". 1 Though James admits that "it makes no difference 
2 
what the principle of life may ben, his dominant theme is whol 
ly different. Like Scheler and Klages, James insists that the 
person establishes meaning and significance to his life not by 
a priori metaphysical belief, but by his "dumb willingness" to 
cooperate with other persons. This willingness is actually not 
dumb at all, for it is an intelligible "marriage ••• of some 
unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, courage, 
and endurance".3 Like Whitehead and Hartshorne, James is con-
cerned with the 
subjective unity in the universe which has purposes com-
mensurable with my own and which is at the same time 
large enough to be, among all the powers that may be 
there, the strongest.4 
For James, "we and God have business with each other" and 
"the best way to serve God is to serve your fellow-men". The 
significance of personality ultimately depends upon the "faith-
fulness of individuals here below to their own pure over-be-
liefs Lt~ help God in turn to be more effectively faithful 











LWJ, I, 130. 
PRA, 95. 
EFM, 309, from 
TCWJ, I, 315. 
VRE, 509. See 
"What Makes Life Significant?". 
Letter to Thomas Davidson, 1882. 
also EFM, 30. 
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continuously stresses that meaning of the whole man and the 
significance of personality entail the unification of the actu-
al and the ideal, and the cooperation among persons. 
4. External Criticisms of James's Interpretation of Person-
ality and Value. 
The purpose of this section is to indicate several exter-
nal difficulties and limitations in James's view of the whole 
man. In the second and third chapters James's view was grasped 
internally and then weaknesses were discovered from his own 
assumptions and postulates. In the present chapter, James's 
view of the whole man was grasped externally, according to its 
retrospective and prospective relations. The present section 
then, is a criticism of James based upon these relationships. 
The whole tenor of the modern climate of opinion suggests 
how such external criticism should be formulated. James's 
view must be criticized in accordance with the principles of 
temporalism, finitism, relativism, social relations, and prob-
ability. Such a criticism can be effective and tolerant when 
it is recognized that truth is in the making rather than al-
ready achieved, that the truth is too great for any one mind, 
that there are no absolutes or certainties, and that truth, as 
a process, is a developing and maturing affair. 
External criticism must therefore reckon with certain 
fundamentals. A philosophy can only be evaluated by a recogni-
tion of the cultural background and the climate of opinion with-
ll in which it functions. No philosopher can be expected to offer 




~ "timeless" and absolute views. The importance of a philosophy 
depends first of all on the relationship it has to its own 
climate, and secondly on its contributions to the continuity of 
human experience. It would certainly be absurd to criticize 
Plato externally for his failure to conceive of a modern demo-
cratic community. It would also be absurd to criticize Newton 
for his failure to discover the principle of relativity. Know- I 
ledge and truth do not come from one man or source, but is an 
on-going proces of enhancing the continuity of experience as 
a whole. Each man may contribute a partial truth. His succes-
sor does not nullify it, but completes it by raising it to 
wider and more comprehensive relationships. 
By the same principle, James cannot be expected to have a 
final and absolute truth of the whole man. James's philosophy, 
like that of Plato and Newton, must be seen first of all with-
in its native climate, and secondly as it has endured within 
11 the continuum of experience. The positive features of that 
I endurance and their contribution to a new climate of opinion 
have already been suggested. The present task is merely to 
observe the limitations that handicap parts of James's inter-
pretation. 
The great limitation to James's doctrine stems from his 
pyhrric victory over absolutism and mechanism. James devoted 
both his psychological and philosophical careers to one con-
sistent purpose; namely, to defeat the finality and dogmatism. 
James lived in and was frustrated by a climate of opinion in 
which atoms, absolutes, and indifference to personality were 
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supreme. The present climate of opinion is nospitable to per-
sonality and value partially because of James's influences. 
His climate, on the other hand, was one in which value and the 
role of the individual were minimal. James's climate can be 
characterized by the phrase passive adjustment. The individual 
for both absolute idealism and materialistic mechanism was 
conceived of as a drop of water ultimately drowned in the sea 
of the absolute or nature. James was among the few who chal-
lenged and defeated this notion. As was seen, James introduced 
new conceptions: that individuals are distinct from nature and 
God, that the environment is a combination of subjective in-
terests and objective process, and that adjustment is active 
rather than passive. These contributions, which have molded 
the present climate to no small degree, have been made at the 
expense of inconsistency, exaggeration, and lack of systematic 
consideration. 
When James sought to defend the meaning and significance 
of the individual, he went to the extreme in his reaction 
against determinism. This is not to say that James advocated 
individualism, but that his emphases which were misplaced make 
for a confused interpretation. When James sought to defend the 
right of the moral intelligence to test ethical hypotheses, he 
confused the test of a belief in God with the actual existence 
of God. -When James sought to defend the primacy of individual 
value-experience, he assumed a highly personal and almost mysti 
cal process that contradicts the necessary interaction and com-
munication of value among persons. When James sought to defend 
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the psychomotor theory of behavior, he enlisted a host of in-
stincts, emotions and motives that actually made for rigidity 
rather than plasticity in his system. When he tried to indi-
cate the unity between ideas and conduct he called upon the 
abstract doctrine of will that offered little significance to 
his wider theory of the whole man. When James tried to present 
a psychobiological account of the emotions, he presented a 
theory which in his day and in the present is incapable of ex-
perimental verification or denial. 
James could be criticized for his failure to indicate em-
plicitly his important doctrines of the role of intelligence, 
the interaction of the person, and the basic nature of value-
experience. From a more sympathetic viewpoint it rather seems 
that the great merit of James's somewhat obscure gem of the 
whole man is that it was richly synthesized in the later minds 
of Whitehead, Wieman, Dewey, Perry, Allport and others. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. A Review of the Problems and Methods of the Thesis. 
II This thesis began with two basic purposes from which it 
derived two central methods of investigating and evaluating 
James's interpretations of personality and value. The first 
I 
I 
purpose was to extract all those strands in James's thinking 
that are pertinent to his view of the whole man. The second 
purpose was to evaluate this doctrine, first as it functioned 
within its native climate of opinion, and secondly as it con-
tributed to the present climate of opinion. 
Two conspicuous dangers immediately presented themselves. 
The first arose from an awareness that James never wrote a 
!theory of the whole man, much less had he considered personal-
ity and value systematically. The second danger arose from 
the prevalent confusions and misinterpretations of James. 
Both of these dangers suggested the need for a critical but 
sympathetic and a specific yet comprehensive perspective in 
order to approach James's writings. Like Edwards and Emerson, 
James's style is deceptively simple. The problem of discover-
ing James's precise meaning of the whole man thus set an ob-
stacle that had to be challenged directly. No less important 
was the search for a base of criticism in order to evaluate 
James's theory with a maximum of comprehension. 
Two perspectives were thus formulated in order to over-
come the barriers of confusion and to satisfy the basic 
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purposes of the thesis. The first perspective was an internal 
viewpoint, based upon the assumptions and postulates of James 
himself. That perspective contained three distinct processes 
or methods of understanding. The first method was that of in-
tended meaning, which is an empathic approach attempting to 
discover what goals James was trying to accomplish. That meth-
od revealed its fruitfulness, for in a short time it was dis-
covered that James was specifically concerned about the whole 
man, rather than faculties alone. The second internal method 
was that of implied or latent meaning. This method tried to 
observe the enduring but sometimes obscure meanings of James 
that he failed to render explicitly and concretely. Several 
examp£es of this were evident in the present writerls defini-
tions of personality, intelligence and value, that were ad-
vanced in the absence of definition by James for the sake of 
clarity and coherence. It was possible and desirable to or-
ganize these definitions on the basis of implications in James 
and on the bases of his purposes and intentions. The third 
internal method, that of internal criticism, stressed logical 
and empirical consistency. This method endeavored to ascer-
tain whether James himself was consistent in his final views 
of personality and value with his fundamental assumptions and 
postulates. 
The second major route of inquiry was that of an external 
perspective, which was to satisfy the second purpose of the 
thesis. In contrast with the first perspective that stressed 
James's meaning and his own point of view, this method stressed 
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the value of James's meaning as determined by a more comprehen-
sive point of view. This perspective, like that of the former, 
had three distinct methods and processes of evaluation. The 
first external method was to establish the external validity 
of James's meanings by standards other than his own. The se-
cond method was to ascertain the relative importance of 
James's view, for his climate and for the present climate of 
opinion. The third external method was to organize external 
criticisms of Jamests view that developed out of this wider 
perspective and which might be applied to James with justifi-
cation. 
The internal perspective was achieved simply by a process 
of systematizing the strands in James into his organic view of 
the whole man. The external perppective, entailing relation-
ships and consequences, was necessarily more abstract and com-
plicated. Such a perspective could only he achieved by dis-
ciplined and systematic principles of criticism. The hypoth-
esis of significance and the construct of the modernclimate 
of opinion were thus advanced. The hypothesis stated that 
ttthe significance of an idea can be gauged proportionately to 
the validity and value of the designata referred to in continu-
ous human experiencett. The construct of the modern climate of 
opinion was formulated on the basis of the dominant ideas and 
emphases that characterize modern thinking. 
The hypothesis once applied to the modern climate con-
tained an assumption that had to be exposed in order to main-
~~t=ain clarit~ That assum ~i~was that the validit and 
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importance of James's doctrine of the whole man could be 
found in continuous human experience. A proposal was made on 
the basis of this assumption that validity and importance could 
be achieved by ascertaining the retrospective and prospective 
relations of James's idea. This proposal involved several 
related direetions of inquiry. From a retrospective view, 
Edwards and Emerson were selected as the two thinkers who were 
most sensitized to similar experiences. There were also two 
directions from the prospective point of view. John Dewey's 
interpretation of personality and value were considered and 
compared to James. The new psychology, a specialized emphasis 
within the modern climate of opinion, was also discussed. 
James's doctrine was then ~plied to these various thinkers 
and movements of thought. The assumption of the validity was 
then justified by the fact that these external relations to 
James (covering a time-span ef two hundred years) referred to 
the same behavioral designata and entailed similar consequences. 
The assumption of the importance of James•s doctrine was jus-
tified by the fact that his basic idea and emphases have en-
dured in the continuum of human experience. It was also justi-
fied by the fact that James was no small contributor to the 
downfall of the nineteenth century climate and to the formula-
tion of the present climate of opinion. 
These perspectives thus developed out of the basic pur-
poses and problems of the thesis. They are linear in that each 
follows empirically if not logically from the former. They 
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are coherent in so far as the thesis begins with an internal 
==~======~ 
coherence of meaning and then develops an external coherence 
I of value based upon a more comprehensive perspective. 
2. Summary and Conclusions to James's Interpretation of Per-
sonality and Value: The Doctrine of the Whole Man. 
The developing and synoptic perspective of meaning justi-
fied itself early in the second chapter. With the doctrine of 
the whole man as the key, new insights became available that 
were formerly hidden by misplaced emphasis. As was later dis-
covered, James's doctrine of the whole man stems directly from 
his philosophic perspective, and that perspective is analagous 
in many details to the dominant characteristics of the modern 
climate of opinion. More specifically, the key was discovered 
in three major themes that underlie every strand in James's 
writing on personality and value. One of these themes was 
that the whole man is more than will, feeling, and cognition. 
The second theme was that the essence of the whole man is val-
ue-experience. The third theme was that the whole man can be 
studied concretely, by a method derived from experience. 
James's account of the whole man began with a description 
1 of the experiential process. That process included the nature 
of feeling, the role of ideation, the role of intelligence, 
and James's account of motivation. Perception, the self, and 
value-experience followed from the description of experience, 
\ and with the doctrine of character James completes his view 
of the whole man. 
Experience according to James is a goal-directed, personal 
selective, and interpenetrating activity. Basic to this 
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notion was James's doctrine of feeling that has two distinct 
but related references. In the Principles James defines feel-
ing as the perception of transitive relations in experience. 
He contrasts this function with the perception of substantive 
states or "perchingsn. Feeling is knowledge by acquaintance, 
directly experienced and immediately grasped. Feeling in 
James's wider philosophical doctrine is a basic experiential 
knowing and communication with things. Feeling is the active 
phase of experience that is holistic, intentional, and empath-
ic. Such feeling, rather than intellect, characterizes v aloe-
experience and for James is basic to religious belief. 
11 The second aspect of experience that James considered was 
the nature of ideation. Ideating is not mere intellectualiz-
ing or conceptualizing. According to James, ideating refers 
to the whole psychological process of events that occur in 
interaction between the subject and his environments. Ideas 
are derived primarily from feeling, but also from theorizing ·1 
about basic apprehensions. The meaning of ideas are found in 
the consequences they elicit. Thinking or ideating exists 
purely for the sake of intelligible conduct. While ideas are 
characterized by their concreteness, particularity, instrumen-
tality, and relationships, concepts are static, abstract and 
universal symbols. 
The nature of intelligence is for James central to his 
meaning of personality. Intelligence is the adjustment and l: 
[accommodation of mind to nature and other persons. Mind it-
self is a relative affair, existent according to the ability 
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to control ends and purposes and proportionate to the quality 
and selection of means available to realize those ends. The 
will to believe is the moral intelligence in action, the test-
ing of ethical hypotheses in order to determine the means and 
goals that are valuable. James's purpose is to find a useful 
but critical guide to human affairs, hence he postulates what 
is actually a moral intelligence. 
The doctrine of motivation was the final topic belonging 
within the framework of experience. James includes motiva-
tion within his treatment of experience because motives in-
clude anything that stimulates human behavior to interpene-
trate with nature and other selves. Though James presents an 
exhausting teeatment of instincts, he dismisses them in favor 
of acquired habits. Though he takes pains to illustrate his 
theory of emotion, it is the nhigher feelings" rather than the 
emotions that are significant in James's wider view of the 
whole man. Though James devotes the largest chapter in the 
frinciples to the subject of "will", in the last analysis he 
rejects abstract fiats of wills and quasi-mystical will-agen-
cies in favor of acquired habits and values that are controlled 
by the method of intelligence. 
The doctrine of perception followed from James's inclus-
ive account of the experiential process. James observes that 
perception is a dynamic function mediating between the subject 
and his environments. Perception, like thinking, is a mode of 
adjustment based upon the impressions of the environment in-
termingled with interests, values, and needs. Environments, 
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according to James, are not chaotic affairs of simple sensa-
tions, but are ordered and intelligible structures that are a 
product of social experience and imagination. Nature for 
James is not only physical nature but also the imaginative 
!
strivings to alter nature in favor of purposes and ideals. 
James's account of the self also followed directly from 
his doctrines of experience and perception. The self for 
IJames, is the self as known, a vivid and valuable perception. 
' The self has no existence outside of its activities with en-
vironing conditions. Though James toys with the idea of a 
spiritual self or pure ego, he never resolves the problem, nor 
is it important to his doctrine of the whole man. Nhat is 
important to his wider view is the theory of the social self. 
James shows how the social self matures into the moral self by 
a transition from egoistic needs to social and religious val-
ues. This moral self is a key to James's meaning of moral con-
duct. 
~ith James's treatment of value and his doctrine of char-
acter, the inclusive view of the whole man was completed. Val-
ue, for James, is organic to all experience. His fundamental 
I emphasis on psychomotor activity, on means-ends relationships, 
Jand his very definition of mind, indicate that James considers 
value to be the essential core of the person. Though values 
Jl begin with needs and problems to be solved, James insists 
that valuation is more than a simple matter of adjustment. 
Valuation is the individual's attempt to alter the actual in 
favor of the ideal. It is the accommodation of nature to 
132. 
personal value. The function of value is to organize and 
direct the personality by structuring the actual in favor of 
the ideal, and by making the ideal conform to human needs. 
This organization is achieved by character which, according to 
/
James, is the interpenetration of habit, will, and value, di-
rected by the method of intelligence. Character is the moral 
will in action. The doctrine of character thus completes 
James's meaning of the whole man. 
3. Summary and Conclusions to an Evaluation of James's Inter-
pretation of the Vfuole Man. 
The fourth chapter was devoted to satisfying the second 
purpose of the thesis; an evaluation of James's doctrine of 
the whole man. This purpose was achieved by testing the hy-
pothesis that the validity and importance of James's doctrine 
could be discovered by tracing its empirical relationships. 
The major task of the chapter was thus to ascertain the speci-
fic retrospective and prospective relations involved. The 
former was accomplished by indicating the vital similarities 
among Edwards, Emerson and James. The retrospective relations 
were discovered by indicating how Edwards, Emerson and especi-
ally James contributed to the downfall of their native eli-
mates of opinion and how they were instrumental in the formu-
lation of a new climate. Prospective relations were ascertaine 
by showing how James's basic idea has endured in the modern 
climate. The modern mentality, the new psychology, and John 
Dewey's interpretation of the whole man were selected as 




importance and contemporary rather than merely historical signi-
ficance. 
Edwards's plea for an experiential religion established a 
new approach to the study of man. Edwards, like Emerson and 
James, tried to show how value is basic to all human behavior. 
Edwards also furthered the notion that experience is personal, 
creative, and meaningful. For Edwards experience was no veil 
clouding reality, but was the direct and only way to achieve 
uholy affections" and a consciousness of God. These ideas and 
emphases, well known by James, certainly testify to the making 
of a new continuum in experience, in which ideas of the whole 
man and value-experience are central. 
Emerson also contributed to this new continuum. His bas-
ic idea of the whole man as "a bundle of value-relations", his 
insistence upon experiential testing, and his emphases upon 
intelligence and value also testify to the validity and im-
portance of this new continuum. Three dominant ideas emerged 
from this examination of retrospective relations. One is that 
man is a whole being; second, is that his basic nature is val-
uational, and the third is that the method of experiential 
testing of possible values is the method of intelligence. 
Prospective relations also testified to the validity and 
importance of James's view of the whole man. The modern cli-
mate of opinion was examined and found to contain sex central 
ideas that James contributed to directly or indirectly. The 
six ideas are: (1) the rejection of absolute idealism and mat-
erialistic mechanism, (2) relativism, (3) the meaning and role 
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of science, (4) experimental inquiry, (5) personality and con-
duct, and (6) the metaphysical significance of personality. 
James was directly concerned with all of these ideas. He was 
partially responsible for the overthrow of absolute idealism 
and mechanism as they dominated the nineteenth century climate. 
His own ideas are not laws or first principles, but tentative 
hypotheses in need of public verification. His emphasis upon 
the whole man laid the foundation for a new science of the 
whole man, one in which scientific methods must be adjusted to 
the data, rather than try to fit this study into the methods of 
the physical sciences. James was also concerned with the meta-
physical significance of personality as his influences upon 
vhitehead, Dewey, Wieman and Hartshorne testify. 
To render the test of significance more concretely, Dewey 
and the new psychology were then examined and compared to 
James. James's and Dewey's accounts of the whole man are 
strikingly related. Both emphasize wholeness, value, charac-
ter, the method of intelligence, and the molar units of means-
ends relationships. The essential difference between James 
and Dewey is reducible to the creative progression of an idea 
from one Zeitgeist to another. Dewey does reject relatively 
minor emphases in James, such as the rigidity of habit, the 
empathic origin of the self, the basic datum of a whole indi-
vidual, and the genetic relationship between will, emotion and 
instinct. From a wider perspective, however, Dewey is seen to 
complete and synthesize the meanings of James's doctrine of 
the whole man. 
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The new psychology was then examined and found to contain 
many of James's emphases. Modern psychologists like Allport, 
Murphy, Spranger, and Stern are also concerned to make a sci-
ence of the whole man, and to account for the cosmic signifi-
cance of personality. Modern theorists are also holistic, 
emphasizing molar rather than molecular units of psychomotor 
activity. The contemporary phenomenological approach to per-
sonality that emphasizes the founding upon personal experience 
of the science of the whole man is also indebted to James. 
Modern conception of functional purposivism, structural and 
functional determinants of perception, social role and role 
behavior, also have their roots in James's doctrine. 
This thesis concluded that James's basic idea of the 
whole man is valid because it has entailed specific consequen-
ces in t he continuum of human experience. It is important 
because it has contributed insights and ideas to that continu-
um that are vital to the modern mentality. James's basic idea 
of the whole man is neither timeless nor flawless, but it has 
endured in human experience because it has been acutely sensi-
tive to such experience and because it points the way, however, 
to new relationships and new realizations. 
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THESES 
1. The whole man for James is a functional unity of personal-
ity and value-experience. James is directly concerned with 
the whole man rather than with faculties and structures. This 
basic doctrine is the key to James's philosophic perspective 
which in turn is expressed in the modern mentality and the 
I new psychology. 
2. Intelligence for James is the creative experiential func-
tion of controlling future experience by the application of 
inquiry based upon needs to be satisfied in relation to pos-
sible courses of action. 
3. Feeling for James is the perception of the transitive re-
lations in consciousness. Feeling denotes the active, inten-
tional, holistic, and basic qualities of experience. Feeling 
is not a separate way of knowing, though it is more basic than 
jconceptualizing. James does insist, however, that feeling 
and cognizing (the creation of means to realize ends) are es-
sential to the whole of experience and to the whole of intel-
ligence. 
4. According to James, value is the very essence of person-
ality. James implies that personality is a self that can rea-
lize value. Mind or intelligence for James is not a structure 
but a relative function that exists proportionate to the pursu-
~ ance of future ends with a choice of means for their attainment. 
1 - --- -
13?. 
5. Valuing for James is an episode in the continuity of ex-
p erience that (1) emerges from challenge and needs, (2) in 
which a value-claim is made to satisfy those needs, (3) that 
claim is then tested by the method of intelligence, and final-
ly (4) that claim is acted upon behaviorally to realize the 
value. 
6. Character for James is the interpenetration of habit, will, 
value, and the method of intelligence. It is the moral will 
in action. Character is the selector while intelligence is the 
controller of possible experiences. 
7. The modern climate of opinion was formulated in one direc-
tion by the new physics and biology of the late nineteenth 
century. In another and earlier direction this climate was 
formulated by the philosophical and religious protests of Ed-
wards, Emerson, and James. 
8. James was partly responsible for the downfall of his na-
tive climate of opinion, that of absolutism and mechanism. His 
emphases upon function rather than structure, upon the experi-
ential process, and upon temporalism and relativism rather 
than finalism and absolutism paralleled those emphases that 
came from the new physics and biology. 
9. James was a major contributor to the modern climate, and 
especially to the new psychology. His goal to make a science 
of the whole man, his psychomotor perspective, and his empha-
sis upon the significance of personality all testify to the 
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~ endurance and importance of his basic conceptions. 
10. James can be criticized internally and externally for 
many defects in his theory of the whole man. Among these de-
fects are (1) an exaggeration of structural factors in motiva-
tion, (2) his failure to indicate the positive character of 
social experience and social values, (3) his failure to in-
clude the communication of value, (4) his failure to account 
ll for the origin of the self, and (5) his confusion of the meth-
od of intelligence with the test of truth. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis has two basic purposes from which it derives 
two central methods of investigating and evaluating James's 
interpretation of personality and value. The first purpose 
is to extract all those strands in James's thinking that are 
pertinent to his view of the whole man. The second purpose 
is to evaluate this doctrine, first as it functioned within 
its native climate of opinion, and secondly as it contributes 
to the present or modern climate of opinion. 
Two barriers were soon met that handicapped these purpos-
es. The first arose from an awareness that James never wrote 
a theory of the whole man, much less has he considered person-
ality and value systematically. The second danger arose from 
the confusion and misinterpretation that attends James's wri-
tings. These barriers presented a problem of meaning and a 
problem of evaluation. 
Two perspectives were thus formulated to overcome these 
barriers and to satisfy the basic purposes of the thesis. The 
first perspective was an internal viewpoint, based upon the 
assumptions and postulates of James himself. That perspective 
contained three distinct methods of understanding. The first 
method was that of intended meaning, which attempts to discover 
the purposes and goals that James tried to accomplish. The 
second internal meaning was that of implied or latent meaning, 





sometimes obscure emphases. The third internal method was 
that of internal criticism. This method endeavored to ascer-
tain whether James was consistent in his final views with his 
fundamental assumptions and postulates. 
The second inquiry was an external perspective, which was 
to satisfy the second purpose of the thesis. In contrast to 
the first perspective that stressed meaning and James's point 
II of view, the external perspective stressed the importance of 
this meaning as determined by a more comprehensive point of 
view. This perspective also involved three methods of inquiry. 
The first external method was to establish the external validity 
of James's meaning. The second method was to ascertain the 
importance of this meaning and the third method was to organize 
external criticisms of this meaning. 
An internal perspective was achieved by systematizing 
the strands in James's thought into his organic view of the 
whole man. The whole man for James is a functional unity of 
'personality and value-experience. Intelligence for James is 
not a content but a method of controlling future experience 
by inquiry into needs to be satisfied in relation to possible 
courses of action. Feeling for James is the perception of 
transitive relations in consciousness. Value is the very es-
sence of personality for James. Valuing is a psychomotor epi-
lsode in t he continuity of experience that is characterized by 
the testing of value-hypotheses. Character for James is the 







The external perspective was achieved by the formulation 
of the construct of the modern climate of opinion and the 
hypothesis of significance. The modern climate is a general-
ized notion of the dominant ideas and assumptions that char-
acterize the modern mentality. The hypothesis of significance 
stated that the significance of an idea can be gauged propor-
tionately to the validity and value of the designata referred 
to in continuous human experience. 
This hypothesis and construct were then applied to 
James's meaning. From the framework of James's meaning of the 
whole man, this application produced several insights. James 
ljJas found to be largely responsible for the downfall of his 
native climate of opinion. He was also seen to have contri-
buted rich and enduring concepts to the modern climate of 
opinion. James's goal for a science of the whole man and his 
empirical faith persist today in modern personality theory. 
Internal and external criticisms of James were made and found 
to be relatively unimportant when James's basic idea of the 
whole man is seen within the retrospective and prospective 
continuum of human experience. 
149. 
